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INTRODUCING AFRICA’S PROBLEM OF POLITICAL JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF JUSTICE IN THE DEVELOPMENT ARCHITECTURE 
Whereas the fundamental problem of development in Africa had been 
construed in terms of strategies and principles locally designed or 
internationally imposed, yet the seeming failures of these concepts cannot be 
separated from their abilities to answer the critical question of justice in their 
formulation and practice. Hence the problem of the endemic susceptibility of 
African social and political life to injustices and perversions has affected the 
development architecture of Nigeria in particular, and many Africa nations 
generally. Evidently, certain technological, economic and political strategies of 
development that have worked elsewhere simply fail to positively impact on 
the lives of peoples, institutions and structures for social change in most of 
Africa in the light of ethnicity, corruption, bad leadership and insecurity.  This 
paper examines the critical impacts of the justice shortfall on the 
developmental processes in Africa, insisting that the challenge necessitates a 
re-interrogation of the role of the human person in the singular task of 
development.  
Many institutions and societies have collapsed owing to the inability to 
negotiate the problem of justice. The substance of the problem of justice 
remains not just the search for community; how wo/men and institutions can 
achieve co-operation for the common good in the society, but even more 
significantly, an examination of how the question of how rights, duties and 
responsibilities can be properly and effectively maintained among the 
members (wo/men and institutions) of society so that development can be 
assured via the establishment of a just system of enduring social relationships 
that can ensure human survival and well being. Hence, the papers will 
highlight possible ways of enhancing the capacity of the dominant social 
institutions and society as development instruments for ameliorating the 
seemingly endless material poverty and moral regression in the society that 
has led to the exhibition of an unprecedented level of corruption, disparities 
in wealth, instability and antagonisms. The paper offers important insights into 
national development and political morality, by appropriating the creative 
inputs of a conception of justice that can provide a new theoretical basis for 
the understanding of the problematic of development. 
 
PROBLEMATISING AFRICA’S PROBLEM OF POLITICAL JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF JUSTICE IN THE DEVELOPMENT ARCHITECTURE 
The problem of justice in development requires further examination because 
‘decades of preoccupation with development in Africa have yielded meager 
returns’ (Ake 2001:1). The issue as we understand it is that the endemic 
susceptibility of African social and political life to injustices and perversions 
has affected the capacity of many African nations generally to benefit more 
significantly from the international development architecture. This crisis seems 
to be the outcome of putatively defective values and value systems, which 
elicit the cultural and cosmological factors in the debate on the rough justice 
triggered by traditionalism, modernisation and dependency. Given the 
cultural implications of the establishment of just relations within and outside 
Africa, we surmise that values ‘lie at the core of our problems’ (Menkiti 
2001:136). If ‘the essence of development is social change’ (Jacoby 1974:63) 
then development, properly  understood as ‘the upward movement of the 
  
entire social system’ (ASUU 2002:34) seems difficult in Africa, due to the 
problem of a proper idea of justice that can underwrite the ideological 
fashioning of viable nation-states (political justice) and the implications of 
inequalities and domination in the international social-political dynamics 
(politics of justice) that have had consequential impacts on the developmental 
processes in Africa. This dual challenge has compelled the re-interrogation of 
the role of the human person in the singular task of development. At the heart 
of development in Africa ought to be the human person and how justice can 
be redefined for a better mastering and transformation of the ‘crisis of 
individual and group identity, deepening social inequality/ fragmentation, 
weakened administrative and policy apparatuses of the state,’ (Laakso and 
Olukoshi 1996:7). As Cooper (2002) says, development in Africa must be 
defined in terms of its simplest meanings; potable water supply, efficient 
schools and hospitals, enhanced agriculture and industrialization and a better 
quality of life (Cooper 2002:91). At least the African situation must reckon 
with the problem of just claims and distributions whether of internally or 
externally derived resources. Thus the whole question of justice implies a call 
for a different way of conceptualization of resources, and in turn impinges on 
human relations. Thus ‘when people change the way they use resources, they 
change their relations with each other’ (Leftwich 1993:607). The justice 
problem in the African political systems is connected to the dual issues of an 
improved power management and wealth distribution within an ethnic context 
(Ndulu and O’Connell 1999:49).  
Received conceptions of development see it in terms of the technological, 
economical or political, yet all of these are determined by the idea of justice 
that is prevailing in human existence. Justice in development has triggered 
concerns about the international and local contexts of the desire; capability 
and power of the state to eradicate poverty, corruption, ineptness, 
authoritarianism, abuse of human rights, tribalistic exclusiveness (Samatar and 
Samatar 2002:4) dictatorship, poor public service delivery, unreliable courts, 
unreliable transport and power, inefficient education, health (Collier and 
Gunning 1999:10-11); and the imperative of conceptualizing and sustaining a 
society where justice will be a reality for all. Undoubtedly, the study of justice 
in development has much to contribute to contemporary Africa which is 
presently faced with such problems as wars, economic stagnation, low quality 
of life, ethnic conflicts, oppressive and tyrannical political structures, 
leadership and poor infrastructures.  Viewed this way, development does not 
lie in erecting modern structures and improving the economy of a nation alone, 
but more than that, the cultivation of just principles and humane values must 
constitute the underpinning of development in Africa. How can these be 
generated from within or outside? 
Given that Dalfovo (1999) has noted that ‘the vision of development has 
differentiated humanity into two camps, one allegedly prosperous and the 
other indigent’ (Dalfovo 1999:38), we clearly need to break loose from 
internally and externally unjust structures. We may repudiate certain grants 
or loans to developing nations only on account of currency devaluation and 
related pre-conditions that are overall inimical to growth. We should be able 
to criticize our national governments that have continued in the material 
exploitation of Africa and the suppression of the poor amongst us. Many 
societies in Africa are faced with the challenge of providing basic frameworks 
  
for defining and articulating mutual experiences on the basis of dialogue and 
compromise. They are confronted by the problems of establishing 
appropriate just values and institutions for the mitigations of mutual mistrust, 
conflict and instability. A genuine theory of development must appeal to 
social justice, and the promotion of human rights at the local and global levels 
to define a new idea of human society. 
The present problem of justice in the development crisis in Africa has been 
occasioned by two main factors: The factors of external injustice (aid, 
impositions, dependency, debt peonage) summarily seen as biased products 
of western ideas and value-judgments ‘retaining a heavy structural and 
cultural dependency’ (Forge 1984:124). Secondly, there is the factor of 
internal injustice (dictatorship, political and cultural inefficiency) occasioning ‘a 
strong disillusionment with the performance of the state’ (Platteau and 
Abraham 2002:104) within Africa. Thence, the justice factor as a core defect 
of development strategies in Africa is illuminated by the normative and 
foundational ‘dissatisfaction with economic development policies’ (van 
Nieuwenhuijze 1988:515). We can put it simply, that ‘due to the 
backwardness inherited from the past, and the relations of subordination and 
exploitation prevailing in the world capitalist economy’ most African nations 
continue to suffer developmental shortfalls (Osipov and Cherkasov 1991: 
271). The problem of justice is linked to the crisis and context of traditional 
Africa. The fundamental cause and expression of the crisis of justice in 
indigenous Africa was the problem of inequality and social ordering that 
ensured systematic consolidation of the dominant trends of ontological closure 
and traditionalistic anachronism. As Davidson observes ‘the ancient inequalities 
of African societies were severe. Women provided the chief source of 
exploitable labour power’ (Davidson 1978:54). This stricture in the realm of 
justice provided an impetus for cultural dislocation and developmental 
suffocation in many African environments. The traditional African society was 
further based on a gerontocratic notion of justice that made access to fair 
treatment, inclusion, rights and privileges, a matter of chronological or 
physical superiority in age. Thus evidence of this is seen in the point that ‘each 
community or society has its form of restitution and punishment. It is generally 
the elders who deal with disputes and breaches. Traditional chiefs have the 
duty of keeping law and order, and executing justice.’ (Mbiti 1969:211). 
Internally, the defeat of Africa is seen in the crisis of justice and social order 
and its spectral consequences on every facet of human existence. This 
generates a process of marginality and the repercussions of these as seen in 
widespread violence, arbitrary hierarchies and avoidable deprivation.   
Therefore, the concrete context of an African idea of justice was to be drawn 
in contradistinction to the core western variants of justice, which as we shall 
show also failed woefully to provide the core concrete and conceptual 
impetus for development in Africa. Externally, the justice issue is seen in the 
consequential aftermath of Africa’s contact with the Euro-American world. 
There was slave trade with its dehumanization of the African, direct 
colonization and all its contradictions. This was succeeded by neo-colonialism 
with its weakening of the African states. The concrete existential predicaments 
and problems facing the Africans did not go away despite the replacement of 
their cosmologies with a foreign one. It becomes clear then that ‘through 
  
individualism, liberalism made some people rich, but did not wipe out 
insecurity and poverty’ (Beland 2000:144). This inverted and contradictory 
context was inadvertently the fate of both Africa and the western world. The 
inability to resolve the justice problem remained an individual experience as 
well as a cross-cultural reality such that the features of the old, transferred, 
and new ideology did not remove the fundamental problems of justice that 
plagued these worldviews. The justice problem became a subject for intra-
national and international considerations, in the light of dominant ideological 
conflicts and reconfigurations of the global hemispheres.  
Most of these African societies have actually failed to create or establish the 
norms and opportunities that can facilitate the fullest development of human 
personal and social life. A survey of the diverse experiences of African 
nation-states shows that there is apparently an absence of a genuine 
commitment to the values of trust and dialogue among the different interest 
groups in these societies. Indeed, the values of trust and dialogue have been 
undermined by poverty, ignorance, ethnic biases, and religious extremism, 
amongst others. This has led to the demands for institutional arrangements for 
the rectification of injustices and marginalization in most of these societies. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
This work adopts the methods of fieldwork, archival research, interviews and 
conceptual analysis in achieving its goal. The specific research methodologies 
employed are in-depth interviews, content analysis, archival research, key 
informants and group discussions. By using these methods the work seeks to 
provide a sharper definition of the problem, to compel a more careful 
theoretical analysis of the associated concepts and to highlight the conditions 
of social reconstruction, via theoretical redefinitions. It adopts the multi-
disciplinary approach and argues that the conscious return to, and 
applications of justice as the foundation of life will enhance the rectification of 
the development problem.  
 
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE TRADITIONAL IDEAS OF JUSTICE AND ITS 
PERPETUATION IN THE ERA OF MODERNITY 
The fundamental cause and expression of the crisis of justice in indigenous 
Africa was the problem of inequality and social ordering that ensured 
systematic consolidation of the dominant trends of ontological closure and 
traditionalistic anachronism. As Davidson observes ‘the ancient inequalities of 
African societies were severe. Women provided the chief source of 
exploitable labour power’ (Davidson 1978:54). This stricture in the realm of 
justice provided an impetus for cultural dislocation and developmental 
suffocation in many African environments. The traditional African society was 
further based on a gerontocratic notion of justice that made access to fair 
treatment, inclusion, rights and privileges, a matter of chronological or 
physical superiority in age. Thus evidence of this is seen in the point that ‘each 
  
community or society has its form of restitution and punishment. It is generally 
the elders who deal with disputes and breaches. Traditional chiefs have the 
duty of keeping law and order, and executing justice’ (Mbiti 1969:211). 
Internally, the defeat of Africa is seen in the crisis of justice and social order 
and its spectral consequences on every facet of human existence. This 
generates a process of marginality and the repercussions of these as seen in 
widespread violence, arbitrary hierarchies and avoidable deprivation.   
The problem of justice is not one, but manifold. But with reference to the 
context of many traditional African societies, three strands are crucial as 
undeniable points of entry: the predominance of African supernaturalism, 
authoritarianism and communalism. But two things are crucial in the analysis of 
these realities, discerning the normative and operational capacities of the 
principles in question. According to Emmet we must define ‘the criterion by 
which we may judge the rule which determines what rights and claims are to 
be asserted and the impersonal and impartial application of the rule, 
whatever it be’ (Emmet 1939:48). This point is important because we shall try 
to show that traditional justice conceptualisation in Africa is weak at these two 
levels vis-a-vis development. How does it define the source of its inspiration as 
it concerns the legitimacy and sustenance of the scope of just rights and 
claims? It rather fails to decipher the adverse consequences of its peculiar 
idiosyncratic and parochial approaches to justice. And more so, it cannot be 
convincingly asserted that even this view of parochial justice prevailing in 
Africa was the perfect model of operational precise execution.  
We are faced with another kind of problem, which is more epistemological in 
nature. The fundamental cause and expression of the crisis of justice in 
indigenous Africa was the problem of inequality and social ordering that 
ensured systematic consolidation of the dominant trends of ontological closure 
and traditionalistic anachronism. As Davidson observes ‘the ancient inequalities 
of African societies were severe. Women provided the chief source of 
exploitable labour power’ (Davidson 1978:54). More than that, there was in 
our view also the problem of justice, understood as opportunity, voice and 
choice for the young or less privileged people, such as slaves. This is a 
significant point in a hierarchical, inward-looking community that exemplified 
a system that basically practiced full-blooded authoritarianism and 
gerontocracy. This stricture in the realm of justice provided an impetus for 
cultural dislocation and developmental suffocation in many African 
environments. 
The African traditional notion of justice operates on a presupposition that has 
been well outlined. This insinuates the fact that ‘social hierarchies can be just if 
they correspond to natural superiorities, since domination may then be 
justified. Superiorities need not be natural, however, in order to provide such 
justification’ (Simpson 1980:491). In the case of African justice and community, 
these superiorities were justified by extant appeals to ontology and 
cosmogony that bred all manners of contradictions and control that convoluted 
the justice agenda. In most African cultures, it is common for a person to be 
asked to overlook or forgive an injustice done him or her either, because the 
offender is older, more powerful or due to familial or kinship ties. Due to the 
communalistic and gerontocratic proclivities of most African societies, the 
balance in a justice situation often tilted in favour of the privileged or elderly 
person. Even in the case of reprimand, non-public remonstrations or 
recriminations of senior offenders were common, due to the endemic hierarchy 
and status preserving nature of these societies.  Dispensation of justice thus 
  
depended necessarily on the stature or status of the offender, as patriarchal 
or elderly or just privileged. These approaches were operational in most 
traditional African societies and were upheld in the definition and application 
of justice. Such ambivalence and the negative feelings that went with them 
inevitably ushered in a regime of social and psychological tension and 
turbulence. Therefore, it must be emphasized that ‘within this tightly knit 
corporate society where personal relationships are so intense and so wide, 
one finds paradoxically the heart of security and insecurity, of building and 
destroying the individual and community’ (Mbiti 1969:209). Security, 
distribution and other constructive tasks are inextricably tied to matters of 
justice.  
Matters of justice in much of traditional Africa also operated in the dual 
realms of ‘this-worldly’ and ‘other-worldly’ involvements. According to 
theoreticians of African ontology, most traditional cosmologies can be 
understood in terms of certain elements that eventually impact on justice. The 
idea of justice in Africa can be reviewed in terms of the ontology, cosmogony 
and especially, the cosmology of these peoples. Nwala holds that  ‘in 
traditional society the universe is basically structured into two main inter-
related parts, there are two realms of existence the spiritual world or 
supernatural order, the human world or visible order’(Nwala 1985:27-30). 
This implies that the African conception of justice is operational at two levels, 
the bipartite temporal and the transcendental realms. In Africa, this dual 
justice connection is tilted in favour of the supernatural, which exerts greater 
control over the physical realm. It draws upon the strengths of ontologism, 
which defines and sustains a hierarchy of beings and postulates a stratified 
and hegemonic inter relation between the beings – above and the beings-
below.  It is instructive that man is placed somewhere in the middle of the 
hierarchy of beings. Thus we establish the hegemonic form of the justice 
principle in Africa, wherein physical and non-physical forces can be called 
upon to adjudicate and dispense rectitude.  
Still on the nexus between the transcendent and the temporal in the African 
idea of justice in the cosmological perspective: Ejizu holds that ‘traditional 
cosmology postulates a fundamental moral vision as it charts the place of man 
in the universe. Man depends on the spiritual beings for his life, his welfare. 
Man’s moral behaviour and cordial relationship with the spirits and fellow 
humans are crucial in the maintenance of order in the universe’ (Ejizu 1987:6). 
To maintain the cosmic order and harmony of forces in the universe, and 
thence the security of the categories of existence, the African wo/man must 
keep and abide by the culture of the people. According to Ezekwugo culture 
is defined as ‘a type of civilization, which a people have practiced over 
time’ (Ezekwugo 1991:4-5). Thus the justice practiced by the Africans is to be 
seen in their age-long activities that depended on a robust sense of social or 
ethnic identity. It is therefore clear that the core western conceptions of the 
justice idea may not have easily fitted into the African cosmological models. 
The question of whether these ways were right or effective is another matter. 
This point that culture is age long practice, is reinforced by Nwala (1985:58-
59) who says that omenala custom and tradition means ‘that which obtains in 
the land or community, according to the custom and social tradition of the 
community.’  This insinuates that social practices embody justice, and that these 
are done according to ways of our fore fathers. This immediately raises the 
question of the defense of a model of justice based on the rule of antiquated 
traditions that usher in a distinctive wave of anachronism and closure to new 
ideas.    
  
Apart from cosmology and its effect on justice in traditional Africa, there are 
other elements which impact on justice in traditional Africa. Two of these 
elements are authoritarianism and communalism. Let us analyze the linkage 
between justice and authoritarianism. Authoritarianism must be understood 
broadly in terms of the concrete manifestation of hegemonic power that 
certified dominance and subjugation either by singular monarchy, elitist 
oligarchy or a messianic theocracy. Seen in either of these ways, there is a 
limitation of traditional culture and its capacity for justice as seen in its 
authoritarian orientation, manifested in the demand and legitimating of 
unquestioning obedience by people to the authorities of elders. Because 
traditional society was essentially authoritatively communitarian, not much 
room could be made for deviant ideas or social practices. This point is 
significant, given the serious communal religious preoccupations with 
strengthening the moral-cultural bonds for collective survival in a physically 
and psychologically hostile environment. Such a situation and the desperate 
circumstances surrounding it ensured that little premium, if any, was placed on 
‘intellectual qualities such as curiosity or independence of thought’(Oladipo 
1996:47). The imperative of community survival, the real life threatening 
consequences of any putative social deviance and the near impossibility of 
eliciting specific and subordinate justice claims from the restrictive collectivistic 
countenance, made the negotiation of non-ontological justice a mirage.  Thus 
the processes and instruments of justice cut across the temporal and 
transcendental capacities and imputations.   
As such, there was also the problem of justice via supernaturalism defined as 
‘the recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having 
control over his destiny.’(Sogolo 1993:57). The ancestral ontological 
configuration of the traditional African societies made this approach to justice 
inevitable. It must be restated that ‘the majority of Africans believe that God 
punishes in this life’(Mbiti 1969:210). Also, metaphysically operative 
principles such as oath taking, curses are also instruments for the pursuit of 
justice in traditional Africa.  Oath taking is a form of ritual treaty designed to 
ensure transparency in dealings. Whatever else this procedure of justice 
signified, ‘it was a means of establishing truth and guilt and discouraging 
other evils in the community’ (Nwala 1985:58-59). Olisa (1989) supports this 
point about metaphysicalism and physicalism in the justice machinery. He 
insists that in the attainment of justice in traditional systems there is the full 
participation of the deities and the appropriation of fetishism, magic and 
rituals (Olisa 1989:238). Other devices that were employed in the pursuit of 
justice in traditional Africa include ‘divination through the oracle, the influence 
of the supernatural and secret societies’(Olaoba 1997:27). Such dispositions 
to life ensured a more systematic philosophy of justice could not emerge from 
Africa owing to the critical shortfalls of these qualities. It is clear then that the 
traditional African notion of justice differed from the western vision in the 
emphasis on a dual temporal- transcendental approach that retained 
intensely immanent propensities.   
In essence therefore, the traditionalist African notion of justice fails to offer 
viable development trajectory because it is defeated by supernaturalism that 
ensures the rise of a philosophy of justice, based, if it must be put harshly, on 
a network of hierarchical collusion, social conspiracy and utter surrender to 
  
anachronism. These proclivities crystallize to truncate the spirit of revolution or 
rebellion. They also fundamentally, run counter or contrary to the principle of 
positive change. According to the philosopher Albert Camus, we face the 
fundamental problem of human life as the problem of the absurd. Thence, he 
recommends that we respond to our predicament by uniting as human beings, 
to transform life into a positive incentive to live and create. It is on this 
platform that he introduced the idea of ‘rebellion’, which he used 
interchangeably with ‘revolt’. The attitude of rebellion is a refusal to remain 
passive in the face of evil, injustice, oppression, etc. it is the determination to 
fight against absurdity, against evil, against injustice, etc, with all the means 
at one’s disposal in a whole length of a life, it restores its majesty to that life. 
(Camus in Murchland 1962: 61). But then, we face a dual challenge from the 
crisis of justice in traditional African contexts that play on the fluidity and 
countervailing powers of aggregated authoritarianism, supernaturalism and 
communalism that together usher in an ossified anachronism. But the greater 
danger is the erection of an invidious threatening subordinating tendency as a 
directing principle. The real fact is that in a repressing environment, rebellion 
must take the form of utter chaos and violence. But a more salient fact that 
decrees the failure of traditional society is that “neither submission nor 
rebellion generates development. Submission leaves a society without 
innovators, and rebellion diverts energies away from the constructive effort 
toward resistance, throwing up obstacles and destruction (Grondona 
2000:48).   
In the context of traditional Africa, this endemic inability to rebel, revolt or 
reform and thence, to achieve endogenous transformation or change in the 
vital realm of values is called anachronism. Trenchant supernaturalism places 
and legitimates all quests for justice at the altar of the divine, and denies men 
the ability to seek their own redress by human generated physical 
instrumentalities. The problem therefore is that supernaturalism essentially 
ensures a kind of transcendentalism that in turn occasions esotericism. These 
features ensure inimical closure of the epistemic, methodological and moral 
spaces of the traditional African practices of justice. This is easy, because the 
supernaturalistic countenance of the traditional African society was further 
based on a gerontocratic notion of justice that made access to fair treatment, 
inclusion, rights and privileges, a matter of chronological or physical 
superiority in age. Thus evidence of this is seen in the point that “each 
community or society has its form of restitution and punishment. It is generally 
the elders who deal with disputes and breaches. Traditional chiefs have the 
duty of keeping law and order, and executing justice. (Mbiti 1969:211). 
This tendency to preferential justice bred an alternate form of 
authoritarianism in social control and made the possibility of social change 
remote. Authoritarian justice, understood as subordination to hegemony, at 
best served to maintain order in the society at the cost of respect for 
individuality and openness to change and progress. The problem of justice in 
traditional Africa was also defined in terms of the problem of representation 
and responsiveness. Authoritarianism was a major factor that generated the 
crisis of representation, understood as how power could be used to serve the 
interests of all or the needy members of society. In so far as the authoritarian 
perspective in a dispute or issue was taken as the dominant and 
representative decree, it became clear that the singular ethical or nominal 
  
opinion of a person or faction in the dispute or under the ordinance of the 
authoritarian patriarch was likely to be overruled or disregarded. The point is 
simple, in an environment such as this, the possibilities of dissent were quite 
remote and far between.    
Another dimension to the crisis of juridical representation in traditional Africa 
can be understood in terms of the intricacies and workings of communalistic 
visions in the realm of justice. Let us note that the corporate nature of African 
communities is defined by the fact that "they are knit together by a web of 
kinship relations and other social structures’ (Mbiti 1969:208). This insinuates 
that the problematising of justice in traditional Africa starts from the ontology 
of community. Davidson puts it that ‘it was conceived in Africa as a problem of 
a consciousness of community. In the beginning, there had been the founding 
ancestors sent from God. These had led their people to a homeland, 
explained by application to God just how their people should live and work. 
Each living person was thus clasped within a community which identified itself 
by its own unique “charter” of belief and behaviour’(Davidson 1978:44). The 
question before us is to determine the extent to which the norms and precepts 
of supernaturalistic communalism were conducive for justice? The communalistic 
proclivity of traditional Africa ensured that justice was seen as a matter of 
communal determination, adjudication, sanctioning, execution, etc. this was 
done directly by the community or by its representatives, determined by status 
or age, both qualifications inherently favoured some and disfavoured others. 
This is because in Africa, status and age went together in the course of social 
development. The question of the possibility of communal transgression made 
it the case that an entire society could atone for a sin, crime or injustice by one 
or more of its members. A society could pay for its leader’s deeds or 
misdeeds. In terms of intra-communal justice, the corollary of that was that an 
entire family or group could be sanctioned for the offence of one of their 
members. All of these created room for the aggravation of resentment, 
strictures, and potential to destructive tendencies in traditional Africa, thus 
pushing to the fore the contradictions embedded in the African notion of 
justice. 
The point then is that supernaturalism, esotericism and the authoritarian closure 
that went with them, were significantly tied with the issue of monopoly and 
supremacy of rights, claims, privileges and knowledge, transformed within the 
ambits of survivalist social inclinations.  Rules were made in consideration of 
the awesome physical and psychological threats from a hostile geo-cultural 
space and an overbearing religiously motivated control process. The outcome 
of the monopoly of particular knowledge is the reinforcement of authoritarian 
high-handedness associated with unregulated power and exclusivist control of 
machineries of free expression and allocation of entitlements. The mere fact 
that the acquisition of the relevant knowledge of the extant principles of 
socio-cultural existence in traditional Africa were based on biological age 
insinuated an inherent deprecation and diminishing of the chances of the 
younger ones to get actual justice, and be seen to get justice. These trends are 
still prevalent in modern Africa, howbeit with rather unfortunate repercussions. 
But within the cultural constant, authoritarianism had other far-reaching 
repercussions.  Mainly, it paved the way for the loss of human and moral 
  
support, closure of outlets of information, betrayal and alienation. With 
authoritarianism in place, it was difficult to seek alternatives or to purify 
existing options in knowledge. 
It is worth noting that the authoritarian entrenchment of dogmatism, 
patrimonialism and hegemony, paved the way for the demise of creativity, 
ability, vision and wider participation of persons in the justice strategy of 
African traditionalism. The ontological vertical movement of power and justice 
ensured a stricture of the social framework of horizontal or spectral dispersal 
of ideas, claims and power. This combination of authoritarianism and 
supernaturalism led to anachronism and the lack of openness to new and 
better or different ideas or ways of doing things. Anachronism made sure that 
the wrong things were done almost persistently. The same old customary 
methods were given a divinity and cult follower-ship of unquestioning 
obedience thus leading to the first tier of the fracturing of the African societies 
along the justice ordinance. Our point, which forms the critical basis of our 
divorce from these core elements of traditional contexts is therefore is simple; 
that ‘there is no room for bias or favoritism in the process of doing 
justice’(Carr 1981:223) whether such be ontologically, social-traditionally or 
prudentially motivated as in the case of the organization of traditional 
African realities.  
The reality of paternalistic justice and the definitive contexts of its peculiar 
African manifestation only served to ensure that the wider cosmological and 
transitional processes that could attain its continuation were not to be ensured. 
Therefore, the concrete context of an African idea of justice was to be drawn 
in contradistinction to the core western variants of justice, which as we shall 
show also failed woefully to provide the core concrete and conceptual 
impetus for development in Africa.  
The point must be made that the demise of African values especially the 
conceptions of justice as operative within a closed knitted community based on 
religious- moral control, cannot be separated from the colonial ordinance and 
its peculiar brand of discrimination, coercive and exploitative justice. It is 
known that ‘the colonial powers brought their values, norms and rules to Africa 
applying them on Africans with whom they came in contact’(Munker 1998:81). 
Central to the injection of the core European principles of justice was the 
creation of an ideological basis for the installation of metropolitan values such 
as individualism, secularism, and equality. Individualism was brought in to 
replace communalism in African social life. This symbolized a 
phenomenological transformation howbeit, a forced one that occasioned a 
new systematic reconfiguration of African geo-cultural realities in the justice 
arena. Thence, the communal or kinship perception of justice was overthrown 
by a more personalized individual account of justice and sanctions, that 
placed premium on the actions of antagonistic juridical relations or conflict 
based systems of the courts, police, etc. Also, secularism was brought in to the 
African cosmology to vitiate the hitherto existing, but truncated construction of 
social life on a closed moral-religious basis. The idea of equality was injected 
through educational and political mechanisms to displace a highly 
ontologically and genealogically stratified African society that had 
demarcated its proportions for efficient but not necessarily just and fair 
  
operations. 
Thus it is true that traditional African religiously ordained communalism could 
not erode the critical poverty of justice. It could not assure Africans of some 
cultural security from the immanent collapse of values, and the expropriation 
of the African lands and peoples. Yet, it is equally true that the takeover of 
the African value systems by colonialism and its ideologies only replaced a 
suffocating but stable space with an exploitative, turbulent and discriminative 
one. This grossly dilemmatic situation has led to the fundamental crisis of the 
philosophical and ideological basis of justice facing the modern Africans. 
Using the ideological platform of the western world, and the twists and 
intricacies that these brought into the global intercultural dynamics, the real 
tragedy of the African experience in this dynamics was that their situation did 
not alter significantly. 
To put it directly, the concrete existential predicaments and problems facing 
the Africans did not go away despite the replacement of their cosmologies 
with a foreign one. It becomes clear then that “through individualism, 
liberalism made some people rich, but did not wipe out insecurity and 
poverty’(Beland 2000:144). This inverted and contradictory context was 
inadvertently both the fate of both Africa and the western world. The inability 
to resolve the justice problem remained an individual experience as well as a 
cross-cultural reality such that the features of the old, transferred and new 
ideology did not remove the fundamental problems of justice that plagued 
these worldviews. The justice problem became a subject for intra-national and 
international considerations, in the light of dominant ideological conflicts and 
reconfigurations of the global hemispheres. Hence, our aim in the next section 
is to situate the core elements of the western conception(s) of justice as decree 
their manifest inability to impact fruitfully on the dual African traditional and 
modern situations for positive reconstruction of viable philosophies of justice 
for genuine development  
 
THE LIMITS OF WESTERN IDEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF 
JUSTICE FOR AFRICA 
Therefore, the concrete context of an African idea of justice was to be drawn 
in contradistinction to the core western variants of justice, which as we shall 
show also failed woefully to provide the core concrete and conceptual 
impetus for development in Africa. The justice problem became a subject for 
intra-national and international considerations, in the light of dominant 
ideological conflicts and reconfigurations of the global hemispheres. One 
major defect of the western contractarian view of justice, is the conflict 
between the priority that it gives to liberty and its tolerance of inequalities, as 
seen in the basically worrisome assumption that the free exercise of genius 
will occasion more talent and productivity and thence, that everyone will be 
better off at the end. Another problem is its applicability to other worlds as a 
gift or formula to attain the messianic vision. Taken normatively, this poses a 
critical difficulty for managing the issue of justice and negotiating its 
application to other worlds. The discussion of the western idea of justice 
cannot be divorced from the liberal vision of reality. The liberal conception of 
  
justice of the western world is a dominant ideology or set of beliefs about 
how to attain the good society. It major exponents include Hobbes, Kant and 
Rawls. The essence of this liberal view of justice is that it ‘favuors atomistic 
metaphors and voluntary relations, e.g., the contract; it is conventionalistic, 
arguing that justice and political society are artifacts deliberately and 
rationally constructed; it is legalistic, emphasizing formal and procedural 
justice; it employs market notions of distributive justice’ (Manicas 1981:280-
281). According to Amin (2000:28) ‘triumphant liberal ideology reduced 
society to a collection of individuals and, through this reduction asserted that 
the equilibrium produced by the market both constitutes the social optimum 
and guarantees, by the same token, stability and democracy.’  Moreover, the 
consequential personal and institutional exploitation, differentiation, 
oppression and hegemony will inevitably breed anarchic injustice, acrimony, 
and a miasma of uncertainty. Nielsen (1988) has put it correctly that ‘we need 
to be concerned with the kinds of social structures, including modes of 
production, that place some in positions of dominance and control and place 
others in positions of submission and powerlessness’(Nielsen 1988:30).  
The intrinsic failure of erstwhile Western conceptualizations (DeMarco and 
Richmond 1977:86) of the philosophy of justice is centered on a tripartite 
analysis of the social contract model of Thomas Hobbes (1963, 1968, 1991), 
the utilitarian model of J.S. Mill (1962, 1975, 1990, 1991) and impartiality 
or respect model of Immanuel Kant (1965,1990, 1991, 1996). These three 
models among others, have failed to challenge and overcome the peculiar 
African crisis of justice and development. Whereas the social contract model 
of justice assumed that there would be justice when people acting as rational 
agents accepted basic practices of society that would assure their mutual 
advantage in the long run, this has not really worked in African development 
practice, due to the nullifying effects of Kleptocracy, patrimonialism, 
institutional decay, antinomies and apathy, precipitation of primordial ethno-
cultural enclaves. The utilitarian philosophy of justice, seen as a way of 
defining the greatest good or happiness of the greatest number of the society 
and the impartiality or respect model of justice, which suggests the recognition 
of the intrinsic worth of people as entities deserving of respect, whose 
interests should be maintained in the interest of the overall common good, 
have also failed due to the realities of cultural, historical and psychological 
inducements to truncate or restrictively appropriate the principles and 
institutions intended for the common good; federalism, industrialization and 
social services.  Taken together, these traditional western philosophies have 
not succeeded in Africa due to obstructive traditional cosmological templates 
that have re-institutionalized regressive authoritarianism, tenuous hegemony, 
ossified anachronism deriving from both the primordial and colonial forms of 
ethno-religious prejudices, stratifications, conflicts, mistrust and mutual hatred 
among groups. 
The traditional Western conceptualization of the philosophy of justice is 
centered around a tripartite analysis of the social contract model of Thomas 
Hobbes, the utilitarian model of J.S. Mill and impartiality or respect model of 
Immanuel Kant and the fairness model of Rawls. These models may have 
failed to challenge and overcome the peculiar ideological and value-laden 
character of the erstwhile analysis of justice, thus creating the impetus for 
overestimation of success in their formulation and implementation. Whereas 
the social contract model of justice assumed that there would be justice when 
  
people acting as rational agents accepted basic practices of society that 
would assure their mutual advantage in the long run, the utilitarian philosophy 
of justice, seen as a way of defining the greatest good or happiness of the 
greatest number of the society and the impartiality or respect model of 
justice, which suggests the recognition of the intrinsic worth of people as 
entities deserving of respect, whose interests should be maintained in the 
interest of the overall common good.  
The reason why it has become expedient to conceptualize a notion of justice is 
that ‘the idea of justice lies at the heart of moral and political 
philosophy’(Barry and Matravers 2000:428). Human beings have had the 
greatest social and existential problems in the areas of designing political 
philosophies that can effectively assure progress and development in their 
societies. It is important to note that the idea of justice is central to the erection 
of a political philosophy. But it is the argument of this essay that the 
construction of a philosophy of justice must be based on a system of 
axiological aggregation of core social and ethical values for social 
development. Only a political philosophy can achieve this imperative. This 
problem draws our attention to the current deficits facing African societies in 
the areas of developing authentic ideologies and axiology of justice via a 
clear and effective political philosophy. As a background Brown (1985) had 
done a full analysis of some of the major philosophical perspectives on justice, 
but his work at that time did not consciously attempt to develop uniquely 
African perspective to the critique of these philosophical perspectives. Also, 
our study seeks to develop a political philosophy basis of justice in relation to 
the African experience.  
Thus the establishment of a viable moral and political philosophy lies at the 
heart of any serious development effort or initiative. The challenge here is to 
elicit crucial machinery for the harmonization of the principles, formulas and 
institutions of justice and social values. As things stand, there is a spectral 
deficit in the postulation of a modern idea of justice that can defend or 
enhance the imperative of a social political development. This fact is 
significant, because most societies are defeated by a dual tragedy of the 
inapplicability of their indigenous ideas of justice to modern social challenges 
and the fact that there is an incontrovertible failure of the western models of 
justice that were imported in the course of colonialism and the pursuit of 
development. The inability to resolve the justice problem remained an 
individual experience as well as a cross-cultural reality such that the features 
of the old, transferred and new ideology did not remove the fundamental 
problems of justice that plagued these worldviews. The justice problem 
became a subject for intra-national and international considerations, in the 
light of dominant ideological conflicts and reconfigurations of the global 
hemispheres. 
The critiques against the core philosophical ideas of justice can be summarized 
as follows: The appealing, systematic and well-articulated justice theory of 
Hobbes suffered from certain internal contradictions that paved the way for 
the emergence of other views. Hobbes theory of justice and security did not 
fully account for the dangers arising from the illimitable powers that were 
bestowed on the sovereign as ruler. Hobbes did not reckon with the fact that 
these powers would pave the way for dictatorship, primitive accumulation, 
misappropriation, authoritarianism and the eventual denial of the same justice 
and security of lives and property. It was this unresolved paradox of justice 
  
and security that other theoreticians tried to address.  
As Ebbinghaus (1968:214) rightly notes, Kant’s theory of ‘the categorical 
imperative determines the concept of duty solely as regards its form. It states 
only what duty as such is and consequently what all duties have in common.’ 
But Wiredu has argued that rules especially rules of morality make sense to 
us not merely on the basis of Universalizability but more importantly on the 
basis of the connection between morality and human interests (Wiredu 
1995:36). Rules do not make sense as rules, rather they retain significance as 
rules intended for some purposes. Apart from those purposes there is the 
question of the context and effectiveness of such rules.  Some of the Kantian 
elements were appropriated by Rawls to advance his own theory of justice.  
The theory of Mill was beset by a number of difficulties, the most important of 
which are then fact that the justice or morality of an action is determined by 
its outcomes or consequences. One outstanding weakness of utility is its 
vitiation of equality and liberty especially in the realms of justice in human 
relations and the subordination of all interests to the greatest good. Apart 
from the question of undermining individual and non-dominant interests under 
the majoritarian or collective will, there is the issue of calculating the 
consequences real or imagined of an action. This situation draws attention to 
the real effects of the imagined and actual outcomes and how these vitiate 
the calculus and validity of the utility procedure. One must worry about the 
issue of who defines the greatest good of the greatest number. Anyhow, 
another objection to justice as utility is that a rational person may decide to 
act on principle without any consideration of the effects. According to 
McCloskey (1971:59) ‘it may be thought to be important to be honest, just, 
fair, for the sake of honesty, justice, fairness and not for the sake of some end 
or ends to be achieved thereby.’  The point can also be made that there is no 
one theory that can have all the answers to all conflicting attitudes to justice. 
There may even be cases in which our natural sentiments of justice conflict with 
those of utility. This means that we can have socially useful, but inherently 
unjust principles as in the case of unwarranted deterrent punishment. The utility 
of such an action may not wipe away our negative perception of such conduct. 
Utility strikes at the human natural perception of justice as desert. As Smart 
(1973:70) puts it, ‘a utilitarian will not be able to avoid the offensive 
consequences of his theory’ in so far as we can understand or endorse a 
principle of justice that justifies, on the basis of utility, retroactive, collective or 
scapegoat punishment or the sacrificing of one for the many. As Smart 
(1973:73) rightly puts it there is no ‘ethical system which would be satisfactory 
to all men or even to one man at different times.’ 
To the extent that justice as utility does not have answers to all the conflicts 
arising from varying opinions about justice then we can understand Williams 
(1973) who says that the utility principle or justice as utility is indifferent to the 
issues of justice and equal rights and it seems to create room for misuse or 
manipulation of justice in society. We must admit and recognize the very 
possibility of alternate conceptions. Thus for Williams (1973:113) 
‘utilitarianism, then, should be willing to agree that its general aim of 
maximising happiness does not imply that what everyone is doing is just 
pursuing happiness. On the contrary people have to be pursuing other things.’  
In addition, there is the problem of the status and influence of the person 
  
making or assessing a utilitarian judgement. It raises the question of social 
reality and social perception. This is equally worrisome in that different 
groups can perceive utility differently thus creating a quagmire. This point is 
important because ‘if we form some definite picture of utilitarian decision 
being located in government, while the populace is non utilitarian in outlook, 
then it surely must be that government in that society is very importantly 
manipulative’ (Williams 1973:139). Apart from the denial of desert that 
utility stands for, it calls for an undiscerning and often immeasurable 
collectivist advantages that are tainted by manipulation and denial of 
identity.   
Another philosopher who engages the utilitarian position by further pointing 
out its grievous defects is Rawls (1972). In responding to classical utilitarianism 
Rawls brings up the idea of justice as fairness, based on a contractarian 
conception of reality. According to him ‘each person possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot 
override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is 
made right by a greater good shared by others’ (Rawls 1972:3-4). He 
argues further that ‘when the principle of utility is satisfied, however, there is 
no assurance that everyone benefits’ (Rawls 1972:177).  
Some defects have been identified in Rawls theory. It should not be forgotten 
that Rawls theory is individualistic though it recognizes the least advantaged 
(Manicas 1981:279). Thus in their most fundamental underpinnings the 
conceptions of justice discussed above are explicit in their devotion to the 
western liberal view of reality. This then is the character of a liberal theory of 
justice that stands in contradistinction to that of Africa to the extent that it is 
based on ‘the vision of society as made up of independent autonomous units 
who cooperate to further the end of each of the parties; which vision Rawls 
presses to its logical limit by deriving the principles of justice themselves from 
a notional social contract’ (Flew 1976:75). Let us not forget that ‘contractarian 
theories are undermined when it is shown that they favour a particular model 
of society’ (Eshete 1975:40). This view of justice is in the first instance, 
restrictive both from an African exogenous viewpoint and from a parallel 
western viewpoint of Marxian theorizing. Engels and Marx apparently concur 
on the ‘total condemnation of justice-talk as mere ideology, and consequently, 
justice seems never to mean anything more than “justice within a particular 
socio-economic system.”  There was feudal justice and there is bourgeoisie 
justice’(McBride 1975:205). Under such as arrangement, Husami (1978:33) 
insists that ‘the distributive arrangements of a society can be evaluated by 
means of a standard different from the prevailing (or ruling) standard of 
justice.’ 
 
THE IDEOLOGICAL AND AXIOLOGICAL BASIS OF METROPOLITAN 
JUSTICE: CAN WE ESCAPE FROM MOTIVES, ATTITUDES AND VALUES? 
With the normative and operational basis of justice well clarified, we now 
move on to examine the character and shortfall of the justice problem as 
interjected by the western ideologies. The difference between the western 
and other ideas of justice can be understood in terms of the statement that ‘a 
society whose idea of justice accords with patriarchal principles of political 
authority is an unjust society by the test of liberal ideas about freedom, 
autonomy and the equality of persons’ (Bellamy and Hollis 1995:1). If these 
  
values identified above are taken, as the core of justice theorizing then it 
becomes clear that the main elements of traditional African values and justice 
may not fill into these conceptual moulds. This is how the problem starts. But 
another question is what happens when there is a wide gap between one’s 
professions and the actual practices of the justice principle? It may be true 
that western philosophies are committed to equality in the political realm, but 
also and more disturbingly, their economic structures have a libertarian 
connotation that ensures the susceptibility to gross inequalities in other vital 
realms of existence. We need to examine the repercussions of such a 
divergent and contradictory valuation process for the quest to develop a 
distinct view of justice for the Africans, who already suffer from a plethora of 
natural and man made problems in their physical environment and social 
systems.  
The question is, how does an ideology such as liberalism impact on the 
activities of justice in the institutional or state forms? Conceptually 
disaggregated, the thrust of liberalism essentially may lead to alienation, 
inequality and domination arising from exercise of superior genius (ability, 
talent and power) that will yield immense gains in influence, control and 
wealth. Moreover, the consequential personal and institutional exploitation, 
differentiation, oppression and hegemony will inevitably breed anarchic 
injustice, acrimony, and a miasma of uncertainty. Nielsen (1988) has put it 
correctly that ‘we need to be concerned with the kinds of social structures, 
including modes of production, that place some in positions of dominance and 
control and place others in positions of submission and powerlessness’ (Nielsen 
1988:30). Thus, the question remains; how can a liberal view that endorses 
freedom and exercise of genius, tolerate outcomes and relationships that 
permit huge discrepancies in wealth, possessions and opportunities (Marx and 
Engels 1990:426)? Practical and conceptual problems such as these have led 
to the struggles for redistribution and social justice within ideological 
frameworks. The challenge is at best, to define a basis of reconciling the 
acceptance of capitalism as the only reliable socio-economic mechanism for 
generating wealth, and a desire to distribute wealth, in accordance with 
moral rather than market principles or considerations. These issues can be 
better situated within the concrete discussions of dominant western theories of 
justice.  
The juridical egoistic morality underlying liberalism ensures that the gross 
inequalities in the ownership of wealth and income arising from the operation 
of a free market economy could neither be acceptable to the oppressed or 
underprivileged nor justified even on ideological grounds. This is worrisome 
when situated in the context of an Africa whose notions of justice derives from 
that emanation of a critically authoritarian esoteric cosmology that 
irrevocably places modern coercive powers in the hands of old anachronisms 
and hegemonic structures. The possibilities of power and wealth occasioned 
by the liberal justice model, combined with the predominantly anachronistic 
and communalistic closure typical of social and political spaces in Africa, will 
translate into a time bomb.  This is what we see in the justice situation in much 
of Africa, where in actual fact the dominant institutions for the definition and 
sustenance of justice have been considerably vitiated and made ineffectual 
by internal and external factors. The brutal fact is the yawning gap in the 
expected norms and corresponding institutional practice of justice in most 
modern African environments. In many African countries, the callowness, 
disrepute and failure of the police forces, courts of law, prison systems to 
  
achieve their basic constitutional goals, are no longer objects of surprise or 
consternation.  
This is why we must not fail to remember that ‘at certain stages of material 
civilization, our choice of a distributive principle depends on the consideration 
given to social values other than justice’ (Eshete 1975:38). This means that the 
issue of justice must be seen against the backdrop of wider historical and 
social realities. In insisting on the question of social values there is a concern 
for the intricacies of the cultural operations that underlie social principles and 
the institutions that are meant to carry them through. With special reference to 
justice, we are interested in discovering the consistency, viability and 
approbation derivable from the notions of justice embedded in cosmologies. 
 Existing philosophies of justice have failed to challenge and overcome the 
peculiar African crisis of development. The contract model of justice assumed 
that there would be justice when people acting as rational agents accepted 
basic practices of society that would assure their mutual advantage in the 
long run, this has not really worked in the development practice in many parts 
of the world, due to the nullifying effects of Kleptocracy, patrimonialism, 
institutional decay, antinomies and apathy, precipitation of primordial ethno-
cultural enclaves and other divisive factors. The utilitarian philosophy of 
justice, seen as a way of defining the greatest good or happiness of the 
greatest number of the society and the impartiality or respect model of 
justice, which suggests the recognition of the intrinsic worth of people as 
entities deserving of respect, whose interests should be maintained in the 
interest of the overall common good, have also failed due to the realities of 
cultural, historical and psychological inducements to truncate or restrictively 
appropriate the principles and institutions intended for the greater or common 
good; federalism, industrialization and social services.  Taken together, these 
philosophies have not succeeded, due to obstructive cosmological templates 
that have re-institutionalized almost globally, a new wave of regressive 
authoritarianism, denial of economic and political rights, ossified anachronism 
deriving from both the primordial and colonial forms of ethno-religious 
prejudices, conflict driven mistrust and mutual hatred among groups. 
 
AUTO-CRITIQUE OF THE METROPOLITAN VIEWS OF JUSTICE VIS-A-VIS 
DOMINANT AFRICAN  CULTURAL  FORMS OF LIFE 
In all, the concrete reality of the tripartite western ideas shows a commitment 
to values that may not work in the African spaces. This is so, when we realize 
the cosmological and social interest imperatives underlying the foundations of 
justice. These considerations effectively make the discourse on justice a cultural 
or context bound event. This claim however, is not to detract from the clear 
universal expectations of an idea of justice. The basic truth is that the 
Hobbesian idea of justice fails in so far as the individualistic rational egoism 
that led to the emergence of the state or society has created a state that now 
unleashes the very injustice or non-justice situation that the state was supposed 
to arrest or modify. What this means, is that the application of Hobbes theory 
of justice to Africa may not work not only due to the nullifying injustices 
perpetrated by the state, but also due to the fact it refuses to recognize the 
communalist non individualist ontology or basis of the African societies. In 
modern Africa the Hobbesian model of justice refuses to foster the definitive 
distinction between the state of nature and the state itself. The core visions 
and values of the state in Africa, is to persecute, terrorize and subjugate the 
  
mass of Africans. The real tragedy of an inclusive communalism grafted on a 
modern individualist perception of reality occasions a crisis of identity and 
national planning that turns virtually every institution or structure into a vector 
of injustice. The real failure of machineries such as the police, armies, census, 
education, etc, can be tied to the irreconcilable contradictions arising from the 
desire to communalise and ethnicize individualistic mechanisms designed for 
social order and change. The communal factor therefore becomes the currency 
that nullifies the play of individualism as a directing principle.    
In the same vein the utilitarian theory of Mill does not succeed in Africa 
because, clearly the authoritarian cosmology of the Africans grafted unto the 
modern state system practiced in Africa, only served to ossify the principles of 
domination and exploitation handed down by the metropolitan powers. In 
effect, there was a regime that did not concern itself with the greatest good 
or interests of the teeming masses of Africans, rather there was the installation 
of a myopic elite control whose directing principle was the corrupt material 
accumulation and appropriation of African wealth and resources for restricted 
selfish purposes. Utilitarian justice was impossible to attain due to the real 
complications emanating from a resistant communalism that became the more 
parochial and ethnocentric owing to scarcity and competition for resources. 
The greatest good theory was defeated by fractious and factional 
divergences between the ontologically xenophobic groups, whose speciality is 
the nurturing of hate and anarchy. Cultural differentiation and the denial of 
dialogue, coupled with the lack of visionary leaders, served to constitute many 
African societies into arenas for the denial of liberty and fraternity.       
Similarly, the Kantian theory of justice as law was seen to be a failure 
because modern African experiences increasingly showed a tendency to 
lawlessness and anomie, that solidified the antinomies and antagonisms 
deriving from ethnic and religious propensities that would not allow people to 
be law abiding. Essentially, the possibility of a universal justice was remote 
when considered side by side with the real tragedies of exclusionist 
communalism and irredentist anachronism that retained a surprising depth for 
hatred, apathy and irrational denial of the need for progress and 
cooperation. The Kantian law was impossible to install, owing to the gross 
disregard for neutrality, fairness and recognition among divergent groups, 
such as could guarantee reconciliation, cooperation, stability and positive 
change in Africa. Hence, the three theories, which were derivation from the 
core western liberal proclivities, were themselves agents of a new form of 
domination and denial that eventually reinforced the very injustices that they 
sought to challenge. As things stand therefore the concrete formulations, 
applications and repercussions of the primordial traditional African justice and 
western models of justice, had a colluding agreement when it came to the 
continuation of the oppression, domination and injustices to be perpetrated 
against the hapless Africans who are more than at any other time now in need 
of development and justice.    
 
POSTCOLONIAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE JUSTICE PROBLEMATIC 
Given the above shortcomings we are thus faced with uncompleted tasks and 
the entrenched postcolonial crisis of justice in Africa. In Africa today, the 
interest in justice and development arises out of the reality of crisis due to the 
pervasive presence and influence of a foreign and dominating tradition/ 
culture and the real effects of an indigenous cultural deficit in some realms of 
  
life. In Africa, the problematising of justice and its development arises out of 
the reality of crisis in the social and cultural environment. In this era of 
Postcoloniality, there is a more turbulent substrate for the crisis of justice in 
Africa owing to the fundamental clash between alien perceptions and ideas 
of reality and justice. Evidently, the ‘split between autochthonous and 
imported/imposed values, norms and rules remains on the map of Africa and 
in the minds of many Africans’ (Munker 1998:83).  
Evidently their demands, or commissions focus on the need for installing 
elaborate procedures of fair treatment, arbitration and negotiation 
mechanisms, and reconciliation agencies which will counter balance the reality 
of marginalization of various social groups in the physical, political, economic 
and social realms of life. The idea is to seek avenues for the effective 
articulation of the principles of justice, and the rules for the distribution of 
benefits in the society. Let us use some case studies to buttress our point.  As 
an example, let us analyze the problem of justice and the crisis of social order 
in Rwanda. One of the most valuable studies recently done on Rwanda is by 
Cyrus Reed (1996). This statement is without prejudice to the contributions of 
other experts such as Lemarchand.  This Rwandan situation is vividly illustrated 
by the bitter and protracted conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, 
who were locked in a struggle for economic resources and political power. 
This ethnic struggle for cultural superiority led to tension, alienation, violence 
and oppression, which eventuality led to a full-scale war. The ontology and 
culture of violence, intolerance and injustice that prevailed in Rwanda for 
decades very easily gave rise to a civil war that commenced in 1990, which 
culminated in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. The Rwandan example shows 
clearly that the injustices arising from the mismanagement of ethnic differences 
is a key factor in the creation of the crisis of social order in Africa. It shows 
that such mismanagement of ethnic conflicts can pose grave threats to the 
existences and well being of countries far removed from local arena of 
conflict. Thus, central to the crisis of social order in Rwanda, was the creation 
of a social atmosphere dominated by acts of injustice, oppression and 
intolerance. And the numerous pressures and difficulties arising from this 
situation led to the negative social circumstance in which the human person lost 
his dignity and intrinsic worth as a being deserving of respect, freedom and 
recognition. 
We can also use another example to buttress our point. The crisis of justice 
and social order in Nigeria illustrates very vividly the grievous effects of a 
complex combination of prolonged and endemic ethnic, political and economic 
problems, which have on some occasions, culminated in the virtual collapse of 
all semblance of society and social life in the nations. Deriving its animation 
from the colonial ordinance, the diverse manipulative and divisive 
countenance of the ethnic interests served to perpetrate the denial of justice 
and peace. It is very important to state here that the crisis of social order 
confronting the Nigerian nation and most of the other African nations is 
essentially a "moral crisis". This crisis is best conceived as the inability to 
create and maintain those crucial, basic and appropriate rules of fair and 
harmonious reconciliation and adjustment of interests, with a view to 
facilitating mutual interaction between the various individuals and groups in 
  
these societies (Oladipo 1996: 42). Therefore, the crux of this moral crisis is 
the clear absence of those bonds, which are most urgently needed for 
establishing and maintaining a model; of community, which is based upon the 
values of justice, freedom and peace. In other words, the conditions of 
insecurity, mistrust and belligerence prevalent in the country ensured that the 
Nigerian polity could not evolve into a viable social order. Given that various 
interests in the society were acting in disharmony, they failed to establish a 
secured mortal, economic and political foundation for the Nigerian state. Thus, 
the Nigerian state proved incapable of upholding the vital moral and 
democratic values required for the maintenance of social order and national 
security. In other words, the crisis of social order in Nigeria demonstrated that 
the vital rules of justice, equity and compassion, necessary for humane, co-
operative and responsible social existence, were not in effective operation. 
From the two examples above, it is deducible that the framework of injustice 
in most parts of Africa is set within the phenomenon of marginality and 
marginalization. Thus it is correct to say that internal marginalization is the 
outcome of political, democratic and human development deficits or 
inadequacies as they prevail within a social system. According to Adedeji 
(1999:32), internal marginalization is caused by the mismanagement of the 
economy and the pursuit of a development paradigm that has polarized the 
different social and economic groups in the society. Nolutshungu (1996:2) 
argues rightly also that the state is central to this process of marginalization, 
because, in so far as states preside over diverse and unequal societies, they 
simply are not always representative of, or responsive to, all sections of their 
populations; neither are the interests and concerns of the state always 
coterminous or congruent with popular interests. More so, within the state, the 
ruling class is almost always central to the existence of marginalization. 
Hence, it is clear that the state in so far as it has conducted itself using 
oppressive instruments, particularly insensitivity, nepotism and predation, has 
been one of the key instruments employed in the entrenchment of the justice 
problem via marginalization in the continent. 
In most of Africa, the state and its agencies are usually under the control of 
the ruling class or political elites, when not directly under a foreign dominating 
presence. According to Fatton (1992:19), the existence of a ruling class 
implies necessarily the existence of a state whose role is to preserve and 
promote the economic, social and political structures of the ruling class 
dominance. One of the major expressions of the role of the state is its 
instrument of domination and marginalization. Despite all of such contrived 
claims to marginalization, we must agree with Dommen (1997:485) that 
exclusion or marginalization is a reality in every society and it provides a 
framework for the analysis of existing policies, and if we may add, social 
values and economic programmes within the society. With regard to the 
situation in most African nations, Adedeji (1999:23) maintains that the single 
most marginalizing domestic factor is poverty, worsened by civil strife and 
  
socio-political instability. Nolutshungu (1996:viii) maintains that 
marginalization makes people vulnerable and is a major expression or form 
of insecurity. The trend towards the marginalization of groups in the society 
has clearly been linked to many instances of failed nation-state project in 
Africa. One of the major expressions of marginalization and insecurity is 
violence. Dominant majority or minority populations perpetrate insecurity 
against marginalized minority or majority populations.   
As such, the consistent demand by some groups all over Africa, for the re-
negotiation of different socio-political entities, is anchored on their firm belief 
that hitherto, the prevailing structures and institutions may not have 
adequately met the desires, needs and aspirations of most of the social and 
interest groups within the society, especially, in view of the individuals desire 
for happiness, peace, justice and security in the society. This point is better 
understood in the light of the position of Nolutshungu (1996:xii) that states are 
central to both the security and insecurity of peoples. In effect, the state 
remains critical when it intervenes in social conflicts, to create security for 
some, and insecurity for others. 
It is quite correct to say that justice is not easy to attain outside of political 
motivation and action. So also, without political action no form of social or 
economic change is possible. It must be quickly stated that the reality of 
politics in most Africans nations is not so positive or academic in outlook. 
According to Sesay (1998:45) political conflicts in Africa are linked to the 
existence of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes.  Usually, in such situations 
of dictatorship or autocratic rule, power is concentrated in the hands of a few 
privileged in the society, while the majority is effectively disenfranchised. This 
raises a question of political justice. Worse still, African leaders tend to hold 
on to political power, even when they are no longer in a position to contribute 
meaningfully to national development, reconciliation and nation building. The 
roles of the political leadership and state institutions in most parts of Africa 
have compelled scholars to describe them as features of a typical predatory 
state.  Castells (1998:96-102) holds that much of the economies and societies 
of Africa have been destroyed by the misuse of capital which has 
characterized the predatory state of ‘vampire state’ which is essentially, a 
state entirely patrimonialized by political elites for their own personal profit. 
Such elites tend to be mercenaries, as their hold on positions of privilege and 
power is at the mercy of the capricious decisions of an ultimate leader. 
In many parts of Africa, the problem of justice is entrenched because, the 
predatory state is characterized by both prebendalism and predation 
understood as political patronage, systematic government corruption, 
concentration of power at the top and the personalization of networks for the 
delegation of this power. These tendencies are prevalent in African politics. 
The political class in sub-Saharan Africa, which typically engages in 
patronage and prebendalism, is characterized by what Hawthorn (1993:336) 
refers to as the lack of a political base outside the state, and a precarious 
position within the state. They have not been politically or economically secure 
enough to allow competition. They have deployed their positions within what 
  
remains the directive and authoritative frames of postcolonial states. The 
African state has attained this unenvied status through the age long process of 
the institutionalization of a decadent political culture which has led to the 
emergence of some of the most tyrannical and destructive patterns of political 
rule in the 20th century. The cases of Abacha in Nigeria, Mobutu in Zaire, Idi 
Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in Central African Republic, Doe in Liberia, Barre in 
Somalia, are illustrative here. Such decadent political regimes whether civilian 
or military, have laid emphasis on what Diamond (1988:12-14) refers to as 
the abuse of power and failure to play by the rules of the political game. This 
trend essentially centered on the endorsement of anti-democratic values, 
political violence, intolerance and extremism in politics. These are the 
expressions of injustice and oppression as we have them today on the 
continent.  
Furthermore, the problem of justice in most parts of Africa can be tied to the 
actions and effects of political practices and social corruption. To this effect, 
the actions of the corrupt national elite can be interwoven with the emergence 
and operations of a predatory state.  Philips (1996:300) holds that an 
environment may be so corrupt that the level of official compliance to duty is 
very low, and payoffs are so widespread that they are virtually 
institutionalised.  Politics connotes the acquisition of wealth by corrupt 
practices.  Politicians were willing to obtain power at all cost, since the control 
of power emphasized the control of the economic strings of the society 
(Nzimiro,(1984:36-37).  The state in most parts of Africa is both patrimonial 
and rentier; as a result, those who are in control of state power and strategic 
bureaucratic offices use their positions for private appropriation.  In the 
patrimonial administration there is an amalgamation of the private and public 
domains.  Political administration is treated as a purely personal affair of the 
ruler, and political power is considered part of his personal property 
(Ibrahim1997:156). The patrimonial state does not feel the need to promote 
the common good and its logic is essentially limited to the distribution of 
prebendal offices and to the reduction of the access of the people to power 
wielders.  A rentier economy is one that retires on substantial external rent or 
a reward for ownership of all natural resources (Ibrahim, 1997:157). These 
features ensure that injustice continues to reign supreme in Africa. This type of 
state breeds a cruel, callous and callow kind of citizens retaining a lack of 
patriotism to the nation, and who uphold selfish interests over the interests of 
all.  These are people who lack moral integrity (Jois,1988:16) and are 
specialists in the abuse of laws intended to ensure social justice.  They take 
pride in the exploitation and oppression of the weak and vulnerable members 
of society and triumph in the performance of malpractices. 
Corruption brings to the fore the critical problem of weakening of the justice 
principle and machinery along with the erosion of other core values such as 
honesty, reliability, cooperation and industry. The major effects of corruption 
include the ‘privatization of politics in so far as this concerns the distribution of 
benefits from economic transactions exchange and capital 
accumulation’ (Goldstein, 1999:574).  It makes daily life and business 
transactions more cumbersome, delaying economic intercourse, boosting costs 
and diverting energies to the concealment of private gain (Hogendorn, 
1996:64-65).  It leads to the abuse of power (Paden, 1997:261) and 
‘deteriorating fiscal and economic management, arbitrary policy change, 
deficit financing, and a chronic, unrecorded leakage of funds’ (Lewis, 
  
1997:305 & 320).  Corruption leads to a blurring of the line between private 
and state property, erodes public trust, invites incompetence and violates the 
very laws and rules that African states promulgate.  In other words, it ensures 
that a government cannot effectively enforce its civic charter and promote the 
public good.  Corruption sustains or continues inequalities and reproduces 
existing patterns of privilege (Fatton, 1992:84).  Worse still, corruption 
ensures that contracts and appointments are not got on the basis of desert, 
thus discouraging honest effort.  It leads to distrust for the motives of others, 
and undermines the credibility of those in positions of power.  It breeds 
resistance to authority and compels officials to misdirect scarce resources to 
low priority sectors (Elegido, 1996:245-246). 
From the above, it is clear that the collapse of infrastructures and the rising 
phenomenon of insecurity prevailing within the nation, are the effects of 
corruption. All of these breed injustices and tension, which eventually 
crystallize into anarchy and instability across the continent. It is quite clear by 
now that things will not progress under the core problematic of the 
Thrasymachus position which is repulsive as a current model of justice for 
African development. Without doubt, the idea of justice as ‘the rule of the 
stronger for their own advantage and hence rulers rule in their own 
interest’(Laing 1933:413) will not work. The rule of the strong has manifested 
in different forms in different ages. At one time, it exhibited as the 
endogenous rule of the patriarch or gerontocracy, with its associated 
authoritarian rigidity, closure, esotericism, normative anachronism and 
phenomenological stultification. At another moment, it manifested as utter 
metropolitan dominance and haughtiness that expressed itself as a 
paternalistic dispensation that in turn culminated in wanton injustices, 
exploitation, and oppression under the tag of colonization. In the third stage, 
the rule of the strong received its neocolonial legitimation from a warped 
African human nature. In this protean form, it was occluded by a miasma of 
cultural dislocation, and delivered in the form a postcolonial animation to 
outdo itself in the dialectical progression of continental human failure, evil, 
debauchery and wretchedness. How then does Africa develop conceptions of 
justice that would be capable of permitting escape from the hitherto 
prevailing crisis situation? Our task inevitably, must be understood in the 
context of concrete realities which ensure that in pursuit of justice, ‘the concrete 
(individual, social and human) ends of man, not the end of some abstract and 
absolute society or state must form the standard’ (Maihofer 1972:297) by 
which we can arrive at a holistic conception of justice capable of moving 
Africa forward. There is a need for a conceptual framework for liberation 
and transformation.   
HUMAN NATURE, ETHNICITY AND THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE  
The problem of justice in Africa is also tied to the issue of ethnicity. This carries 
to absurd and devilish proportions that real context and effect of perceived 
human difference that is now given a currency or directing force. According to 
Goldstein (1999:213) ethnic conflict is the most important source of conflict 
now occurring throughout the world. Conflicts occur among ethnic groups 
construed as large groups of people sharing common religious, linguistic, 
  
ancestral and cultural features, which constitute the basis of their identity, 
when there is disagreement over who controls government, resources or 
territory. Thus central to the existence of political and economic conflict in 
Africa at large, has been the perception of some ethnic groups or social 
interests that they have been deprived or denied of the benefits of power 
and national resources. Ultimately, the outcome of this has been the 
intensification of conflicts within, and between groups in these affected 
societies. In almost all of its history, politics in Nigeria, as in other African 
nation-states, has been defined according to regional parties aligned along 
ethnic dimensions. Diamond (1988:38-42) holds that since independence, 
politics in countries such as Nigeria has always been defined along regional 
lines. 
Graf (1983:195) argues that the processes of elite formation were contingent 
on their capacity to meet the demands of their various ethno-political 
constituencies. This situation compels the elite, and subjects them to a cross 
pressure to divert or channel government resources to their ethnic and kinship 
group. This situation arises because the elites need the support of these ethnic 
groups in order to remain in power. Such diversions and clientelism within the 
context of scarce national resources had to be accomplished at the expense 
of other elites’ constituencies, thus, ensuring the permanence of conflicts over 
appropriation, resources and position within the country. The consequence of 
such ethnic conflicts and chauvinism have not only been the prevalence of 
violence and hatred among groups in the society, but, also that there are 
those who are still tied to the feudal social order, a social order that is 
antithetical to a democratic order (Nzimiro 1984:11). 
Irving Howe has advised that we must not ‘succumb to the current uncritical 
glorification of ethnicity. The ethnic impulse necessarily carries with it dangers 
of parochialism’(Howe 1977:15). From all indications, it may well be that 
‘ethnicity marks off differences that make a difference. Perhaps ethnicity has 
made a greater difference than it should’ (Meadows 1957:341). The real and 
vital question here and now, is to determine the extent to which ethnically 
inclined societies have been able to ‘free their peoples from the ancient curse 
of poverty, ignorance, oppression, preventable disease and natural 
catastrophes’ (Gross 1974: 213). As Orlando Patterson has forcefully put it, 
‘ethnic pluralism has no place in a democratic society based on humanistic 
ideals. It is, first, socially divisive. Second, the ethnic revival is a dangerous 
form of obfuscation. There are the real issues such as poverty and 
unemployment, racism, sexism and environmental assault’ (Patterson 1978:36).  
In looking at the mechanism of social control that both embodies and underlies 
ethnicity we cannot but examine what ethnic groups are, what are those things 
that make ethnic groups distinct? What are the manifestations of ethnicity and 
how do these become consequential for human social and political existence 
whether positively or negatively? The popular conception of ethnicity is that 
which highlights its prominent negative aspects. Odugbemi (2001) makes it 
clear that ‘ethnicity undermines the fundamental values without which we 
cannot build a sane, serious, democratic society’ (Odugbemi 2001:70). This 
insinuates that the current expression of ethnicity directs the human ethical 
conscience away from civility and order, to putatively violent, primeval and 
bestial exhibitions. But this is only possible against the background of the 
arrangements that ethnicity represents and the phenomenological possibilities 
  
that such cosmologies can display. Thus Galey (1974) holds that the processes 
of culture that define ethnicity may also influence citizenship attitudes to 
development and integration in a national context (Galey 1974:270). These 
cultural processes and influences are therefore essentially cognitive and 
transmittable. 
If this is so, then ethnicity becomes potent because living styles, values and 
behaviour are cognitively acquired and transmitted to new generations 
through social institutions such as family and tribe. These may encourage 
resistance and/or openness to change (Galey 1974:270), which either relates 
to the self or even others. There are a number of values and visions that 
ethnicity transmits which make it a force that is self-animating and equally 
countermanding to dominant modernizing instruments such as the state. 
Ethnicity transmits specific views of economic relations, loyalty, and identity, 
amongst others.  Clapham (1991) holds that ethnicity is a very effective basis 
for mobilizing political support and family and kinship ties provide more 
reliable means of achieving loyalty than the state and its bureaucracy 
(Clapham 1991:98). This situation obviously has profound consequences for 
establishing and sustaining community and consensus. Goulbourne (1997) 
notes that the mobilization around ethnic credentials as seen in the operations 
of minorities or majorities, depends significantly on the political and economic 
circumstances that define inter-group relations. Thus the mobilization of 
ethnicity entails the mobilization of bias (Goulbourne 1997:166).   
Also Lemarchand (1974) says that the overwhelming aim of ethnicity is its 
focus on exclusion of others from power. The ensuing contexts and struggles 
for control have decisive negative impacts on patron-client relationships, and 
inter-ethnic identities (Lemarchand 1974:143). Such convolutions in social 
organization and psychological predispositions simply replace the question of 
human survival on the center stage. Taken theoretically, this implies a 
complete gyration to human conduct in a modern era operating according to 
the primordial basics of human nature.  
Human nature is a critical aspect of human existence. Berry (1986:xiii) insists 
that ‘social and political organization has to accommodate itself to the human 
nature and not vice versa.’ In other words, human nature is a primal symbol in 
the quest for understanding ethnicity. This is a conceptual issue having far 
reaching empirical consequences. Dewey (1974) makes the vital point that the 
nearly immutable innate needs of human beings define human nature. Permit 
me to put the ideas exactly in his words. Dewey says that  
“I do not think it can be shown that the innate needs of men have 
changed since man became man or that there is any evidence that they 
will change as long as man is on the earth. Needs for food and drink and 
for moving about, need for bringing one’s power to bear upon 
surrounding conditions, the need for some sort of aesthetic expression 
and satisfaction, are so much part of our being. Pugnacity and fear are 
native elements of human nature. But so are pity and sympathy “(Dewey 
1974:116-118).  
The foundational character of human nature is to be apprehended and 
connected to what Mill (1962) refers to as the natural sentiment of justice, 
which is defined by the interplay of the purportedly innate ideas of 
punishment, self-defense and sympathy. Permit me again to quote Mill at 
length. He states that 
  
 “two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are, the desire to 
punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that 
there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been 
done. The desire to punish …is a spontaneous outgrowth from two 
sentiments, both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or 
resemble instincts; the impulse of self-defense, and the feeling of 
sympathy. A human being is capable of apprehending a community of 
interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part 
such that any conduct, which threatens the security of the society 
generally, is threatening to his own and calls forth his instinct of self-
defense” (Mill 1962:306-307).  
Human nature and its significance for survival and progress make further 
sense only in the context of the social nature of man. According to Mackenzie 
(1963:35) ‘human association, societies are first formed for the sake of life; 
though it is for the sake of good life that they are subsequently maintained. 
The care of the young, the preservation of food and drink, the provision of 
adequate shelter and protection would suffice to account for the existence of 
human societies.’ This implies that society is necessary for some level of 
comfort and hope for the human being. 
But we also know from history that human associations have been the core 
sources of security problems. For example, there is the problem of tyranny 
and man’s inhumanity to man, as seen in the internal operations of human 
actions in a society. There is the wider social insecurity generated by human 
intercultural conflicts among human associations. All of these problems can be 
predicated upon the personal and social manifestations of human nature and 
human actions. The clearly psychological, cultural and economic motivations of 
human nature are further highlighted in the problems of human finitude and 
limitations, seen as our ethical and metaphysical imperfections. We also 
confront the restrictive limitations of our peculiar human natures as individual 
human beings. And all of these taken together pose a stumbling block to our 
search for perfect human relations. Given the reality of conflicts and 
prejudices, Brown (1989:3) says that ethnic conflicts can be explained using 
the natural tendency towards ethnocentrism: people seem to trust and prefer 
those of their own cultural group, while being distant and distrusting of others. 
 The increasing tendency of ethnic people to think fundamentally in terms of 
the ethnic group (Said and Simmons 1975:65) leads to the real threat of 
mutual annihilation or the massive repression of the less privileged and 
competitors. We can understand the full import of things, when we read and 
see that ethnicity has led to state - sponsored slaughter, the oppression and 
murder (Riggs 1994:584), unparalleled cultural diversity heralding constant 
conflict and bloodshed (Campbell 1992:58) and sentiments motivating people 
to acts of extreme violence against the Other (Turton 1997:3). For Turton 
(1997:11) ethnicity has a strong mobilizing power to acquire greater 
leverage and competitive advantage. Thus ethnicity often gives rise to ethnic 
conflicts in which people decide to employ their ethnic differences in pursuing 
competing interests (Osaghae, 1994:9). The end result of all of this according 
to Rosel (1997) is that ethnic conflicts have become politicized and 
radicalized thus assuming a self-sustaining character, which threatens the 
legitimacy and integrity of multi-ethnic states. Through the politicization and 
militarization of ethnic conflict, groups acquire the self-awareness and 
organization, cohesion and bitterness, and finally, intransigence and cynicism, 
which make a peaceful and enduring resolution or settlement difficult to 
negotiate (Rosel 1997:146&153). The ethnic phenomenon has core 
  
cosmological features that define or explain its operation. 
The negative effects of social hierarchical differentiation, which manifests in 
the use of ethnic, caste and class divisions (Glaser 1954:25) are now in need 
of urgent and sustainable clarification and correction with regard to Nigeria. 
David L. Miller has insisted that ‘to contribute to the solution of social problems 
[requires] working to make room for cooperation. Cooperation between 
groups with regard to the attainment of common values requires common 
norms and the dissolution of relative ones so as to ensure peace, security and 
stability inn human society’(Miller 1951:148-149). The solutions offered by an 
alternative conception of our social experience, suggest, ‘common action by 
the poor, major movement for social change require alignments that move 
past ethnic divisions’(Howe 1977:16).  In other words, we are interested in 
‘value-judgements and images of the future [that] can prompt constructive 
responses to real societal problems’ (Wilson 1978:24).  
Bertsch (1991:547) draws attention to the human factor by arguing that 
‘human dignity begins in the minds of human beings.’  Some people have 
always been dedicated to the ideal of a common society in which ethnic 
differences would not be relevant for the recognition of rights, the allocation 
of benefits and opportunities (Kuper, 1974:24). What is needed therefore is 
‘not a backward-looking loyalty to tribe or ancestral homeland, but rather a 
forward looking loyalty to a creed whose assertion’ (Menkiti 2002:44) is in 
our view irrevocably committed to the common good, social stability, human 
excellence and achievement, unleashing of genius and creativity for individual 
and collective well being.  Gyekye (1997) holds that change in citizenship 
attitudes world require greater fairness in the distribution of the resources and 
burdens of the state to create an open society or a democratic society in 
which the interest of every citizen irrespective of ethno cultural background 
are expected to be given equal consideration (Gyekye 1997: 84&89). Such 
a society must be based on a fully developed sense of accountability as well 
as the politics of accommodation, participation and compromise so that every 
citizen can contribute to the common good, and upholding of values such as 
equality, social justice, self-determination and the rule of law. 
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL REALM: THE 
RELEGATION OF AFRICA 
The problem of justice construed as an international issue focuses on 
globalization and the quest for a framework for rethinking the ethical 
requisites for a new global philosophy. Africa and the world are living in an 
era of intensified globalization; a process marked by accelerated flows and 
accelerated closures as well (Nyamnjoh 2003:1). The critical threshold of 
turbulence and imbalance can be seen in the fact that globalization is a 
political and socio-economic phenomenon with important practical implications 
(Alexander 2001:55). Specifically, with respect to Africa, the implications of 
globalization are debilitating, given a surge of unaccountable and unelected 
national and international dispensation of power through either direct causal 
or regulative hegemony. It is true that problems facing the world today have 
considerably worsened due to the activity in global leadership, of a causal 
and regulative control or construct that has jettisoned the culture of dialogue, 
accountability and respect for consensus on divergent views and perspectives.  
  
Africa is locked in the throes of two unpalatable alternatives: paternalism or 
domination, which suggest dependency and incapacity. This problem is made 
particularly worse by the despair of Africa’s place in the world (Helleiner 
2002:531). The real contexts of Africa’s condition are traceable to its 
increasing marginalization in the global economy (Wright 1998:133). This 
marginality is occasioned by technological forces, which have made Africa a 
supplier of primary or raw materials subject to suffocating metropolitan 
control (Morgenthau 1967: 298). This essay seeks sustainable strategies for 
the injection of moral or ethical principles and values into a discontented 
world order plagued by a philosophy of dominance that can only serve as a 
blockade to multicultural morality and global philosophy. This inquisition is 
important because we must look for more systematic ways of making 
globalization enrich our lives beyond mere economic or cultural accretions. 
We are in need of a more fundamentally analytical and philosophical 
understanding of the dynamics of global discontents and complexities. There is 
a need for important human values that are of global significance in 
mitigating discontent. An example of such is justice. The global impetus for 
change must depend inevitably on the holistic conceptualization of the notions 
of harmonization, mutual solidarity and cooperation for the peaceful 
coexistence of all states. This is crucial in view of positive action for the 
liquidation of invidious imperialism.  
The interplay between globalization, politics and the rise of inequality 
provides a point of entry for our analysis. We can understand easily the point 
that ‘globalisation is as much about politics as it is about economics. The link 
between gl obal i sa t ion and ine qual i ty  requ i re s fur th er 
investigation’ (Alexander 2001:59,61). The concept of inequality manifests in 
different forms. For our purpose, it is enough to know that ‘two major sorts of 
inequalities of income and wealth exist: inequalities within nations and 
inequalities among nations’ (Demarco 1981:392). We are interested in the 
latter due to the challenge of theorizing the conceptual and empirical basis 
for creating and sustaining a harmonious world order. In such an order, each 
group or state presumably has equal opportunity to satisfy his or her basic 
need. This view of the world has been aptly posited by Toure (1975:671) that 
‘in awareness of the specific problems resulting from our historic background 
and our material conditions, the gravest imbalance in the world and the most 
dangerous, is the imbalance created by the division into rich and poor nations, 
the haves and the have-nots.’ 
The above point is significant in the context of a multinational global 
community where the widely diverse difficulties and contradictions of societal 
life are usually reflected in the form of problems and frictions that lead to 
deprivation, injustice, conflicts and insecurity. Insecurity is either the cause or 
effect of historical realities or social conditions. These together ascribe an 
identity to the (in) secure. Thus Resnick (1996:133) insists that we have ‘among 
the most acute problems that bedevil the world, those linked to conflicting 
forms of identity’. And with special reference to  Africa, ‘this is a critical 
moment in the history of African peoples.  One word to characterize their 
present status would be “insecurity”.  This insecurity affects virtually everyone.  
The poor and disadvantaged of course suffer most’ (Joseph 2002:1). Part of 
this insecurity is generated from within the continent while a more significant 
component is derived from certain global realities that inadvertently 
undermine the Africans.  
  
Against this backdrop, we join Goulet (1983:610) in posing the provocative 
but foundational moral and political question of ‘why have privileged nations 
and social classes, even when professing moral ideals of compassion and 
justice, failed to mount a successful war on global poverty?’  This same 
question was previously posed even more normatively and directly by Beitz 
(1975:360) as ‘do citizens of relatively affluent countries have obligations 
founded on justice to share their wealth with poorer people elsewhere?’  This 
issue raises a question about the duties of perfect and imperfect obligation 
especially as these relate to the question of moral and just conduct. At one 
level, we may ask whether the search for global justice and economic 
redistribution is a matter of benevolence or strict duty from the rich to the 
poor nations? The moral import of this question lends support to its 
epistemological basis as seen in the question; how come those who claim to 
know better, to have the best facilities in terms of ideas and materials, have 
not been able to do much more (in terms of justice, fairness, compassion) than 
what we see in the world today.  
These questions are vital because we do not want what some scholars have 
termed as global development ethics to become a weapon or tool of 
deception, both of the self and others. If this happens, ‘it could make people - 
especially the privileged of the north and West – feel good about doing bad 
things’ (Crocker 1991:463). But the conceptual and ethical complexity of the 
general situation described above remains in so far as we can make further 
distinctions in the problem of justice earlier posed. For his part, Paton (1942) 
insists that there are two problems within this problematic of the relations 
between the nations and states of the world under the global ordinance. 
These are ‘the problem of moral justice among nations and the problem of 
legal justice’ (Paton 1942:291). Essentially, the former raises questions about 
whether humanity as a whole or any component of it has attained the 
capacity to distinguish right from wrong and to act accordingly for proper 
harmonization of interests for the overall good of all. The latter raises 
questions about the conceptualization and existence of the instruments or 
institutions that can attain global justice. It is in these senses that the question 
of the lopsidedness of globalization arises. 
The crisis of global morality compels a clarification of the current situation. The 
point is that states, principles and ‘social institutions come under the pressures 
of globalization. Let us note that coming to terms with globalization is as likely 
to involve rejection as acceptance’ (Brown 1995:55). If this is true then we can 
ask the philosophical question of ‘what are the ethical and political 
consequences of adopting’(West 1985:267) certain cultural and political 
practices?  These apparently epistemological and ethical posers in our work 
are further dependent on core existential and phenomenological foundations 
that have been captured by a philosopher- Strawson. He states that ‘men 
make for themselves pictures of ideal forms of life. Such pictures are various 
and may be in sharp opposition to each other’ (Strawson 1961:1). The picture 
that one has of the self and others will fashion what one is and will ever 
become. To be specific, what picture can or should the African get from a 
biased globalization and a worrisome US foreign policy that seems to pursue 
vigorously (by omission and commission) the undermining of Africa? The 
challenge therefore is how we can create and sustain a more positive 
conception of global reality that will ensure security and comfort for the 
different parts of the world especially the less privileged or marginal areas. 
We must analyze further the intricacies of globalization. 
According to Held, the emergence of capitalism ushered in a fundamental 
  
change in the world order making possible for the first time, genuine global 
interconnectedness among states and societies. In this way, globalization 
penetrated the distant corners of the world, and brought far-reaching 
changes to the dynamics and nature of political rule (Held 1993:30). Above 
all, Held holds that economic globalization has arguably become more 
significant than ever as the determinant of Hierarchy or the structure of 
dominating countries. This conception of globalization ensures Europe and 
North America constitute the nucleus of economic globalization (Held 
1993:30-31). One valuable consequence of globalization as Held argues is 
the fact that it implies that political, economic and social activity is becoming 
worldwide in scope and that there has been an intensification of levels of 
interaction and interconnectedness within and among states and societies. But 
there are alternative positions that have been offered by scholars who do not 
share the optimism of Held.  
Scholars have identified major shades of resistance to the traditional positive 
view of globalisation. In one view, globalisation has been described ‘as a 
continuation of imperialism under another name’. Another view sees 
globalisation as ‘the latest label for the same basic process or mission 
previously described in modernisation’ (Alexander 2001:57). Such nuances 
are worth paying attention to when we realize that globalization can be 
interpreted in terms of two visions: the benign and the malignant.  Essentially, 
the benign one is based on voluntary exchanges and free circulation of 
peoples, capital, goods and ideas, while the malignant view is defined by 
coercion and brute force (Milanovic 2003:668). A further historical 
interpretation or conceptual analysis of the trajectory of globalization can 
only reinforce some of the main points that we seek to clarify in this essay. 
According to Hoggart (1966:247) ‘that quality of perception, in quoting 
Auden’s The American Scene is a capacity to see not only individual instances, 
but deeper and more long term movements below the surface detail; an 
ability to unite the dissimilar, to reveal a pattern out of a mass and a mess’. 
However, ‘recalcitrant conservatism cannot be allowed to block the 
development of new knowledge and the alternative futures that it might 
encourage, particularly when far reaching questions of human and planetary 
security are at stake’ (Scholte, 1996:49-50).  As Hammouda (1999:72) puts it 
‘globalization appears as a complex and incomplete phenomenon whose 
logic unfolds contradictorily with both openings and regressions.’  In a 
significant way, the character of our world today is seen in the extremely 
tentative character of things (Kothari 1997:227).  There are major shifts in 
power and influence.  There are demands for the redefinition of priorities; 
there are major convulsions of thought and identity and what these can 
produce. 
Under globalization, the question of distribution and the diverse placements 
of individuals and groups cannot but occasion an enquiry into the state of 
marginal territories and their quest for survival.  According to Amin (2000:29) 
the marginalized peripheries have neither a project nor their own strategy.  
Countries in this group are therefore the passive subjects of globalization. 
Their passivity crystallizes into alienation and deprivation. According to Opel 
(1987) the most serious threat to economic progress comes from the reality of 
an uneven distribution of the dividends and products of that economic 
progress.  We are frequently reminded, ‘that in much of the third world 
hundreds of millions are still living on the ragged edge of survival.  With few 
exceptions their progress in development has been despairingly slow, our 
efforts to aid them have ended in disappointment’ (Opel, 1987:54). The 
  
meaning of all this is that ‘a glancing familiarity with the globalization 
literature will make plain the extent to which globalizing forces have 
debilitated social coherence and resilience’ (Whitman 2002:55).  What are 
the effects of these convolutions and imbalances? 
The shortfalls of globalization seem to define the complicatedness of the 
demands of an increasingly diverse and modern world where there is a 
struggle between tentativeness and permanence, good and evil, civility and 
savagery.  The question is where do our ideas, processes and institutions stand 
in the quest for genuine civilization? The allure of civilization has generated a 
crisis of expectations without a corresponding capacity for fulfillment. Hence, 
Ghali (1995) holds that the globalization of the economy and communication 
has produced high levels of economic expectation and political awareness 
around the world.  People everywhere want to have an input or contribution 
in the vital decisions that affect them.  There is a greater consciousness of the 
distribution of economic and political power as well as the means for attaining 
such distributions.  In our view this is where democracy and social justice as 
well as the linkages between them come to bear on the challenge of our 
humanity (Ghali, 1995:4).  The expectations are not only in terms of material 
goods but also in terms of values and other ideational basis of social reality. 
This situation definitely poses a challenge to all in the world.  Amin (2000:31) 
makes the point that today’s societies are confronted by new challenges on all 
levels.  We are in need of upgrading our quality of perception as central to 
the rectification of the human situation. The philosophical and scientific nature 
of the essay can only be projected when we have demonstrated fairness in 
our analysis. We must now present the purported positive visions and values 
of the United States as an impetus for defining US involvement in 
globalization and the dynamics of global leadership. 
It has been said that ‘globalization is another word for US domination’(Amin 
2000:31). But a number of questions arise from this statement. Is it the case or 
is it not the case? If it is not the case, what has led to this misconception? 
However, if it is the case, then what are the instruments by which US attains 
this goal of domination? Is it through its foreign policy? If yes, what are the 
foundations (moral, historical, political and even philosophical) bases of this 
foreign policy? If the historical and political bases of US foreign policy have 
been clarified, then what insights can we elicit from the ethical and 
philosophical dimensions? How can the US rectify this misconception? Does it 
want, or need to rectify it? How, if at all, can the ethical-philosophical basis of 
US foreign policy be a way to confront the problems of global justice, power 
and poverty? What part has the US played in tilting the world of balance? 
To start with, Buchan (1977:15) informs us that ‘the united states largely 
brought the present international system into being.’  We may wonder if 
anyone can argue on any basis that U.S. domination is compatible with social 
justice?  More so is the claim ‘the united states largely brought the present 
international system into being’ to be taken as a justification for the intrusion 
and domination of the US in world affairs. Is this a defense of 
mismanagement and parochialism? Is this a justification of the neglect of 
Africa in the scheme of world affairs? Perhaps, we need to authoritatively 
determine the extent of US involvement in global affairs. Brzezinski  
(1960:710-711) makes it clear that “America finds herself so deeply involved 
in the world economy that on the economic plane the concept of isolationism 
becomes at worst a suicidal policy and at best an irrelevance.’  After 
overcoming the problematic of urbanization and post American civil war 
reconstruction the foreign policy relations of the United States was evolved in 
  
terms of a blatant economic nationalism seen as ‘the effort to open the 
markets everywhere to free competition. Every negotiation of a commercial 
treaty centered on the inclusion of a most favoured nation clause’ (Varg 
1977:263). 
Slater (1977:3) reinforces the above point by saying ‘that the central goal of 
US domination is commonly described in economic categories. Using its vast 
economic power, the united states works to keep the rest of world 
conservative, capitalist and docile.’  This vision and plan has essentially not 
changed. According to Fain, Plant and Milloy (1977:146&149) ‘it is widely 
agreed that United States foreign policy will focus with greater intensity than 
before on economic and technological problems. International economic 
developments have great urgency and significance at present and will 
certainly remain in the front rank of foreign policy problems in the future.’  
Unfortunately, the rash of ethnocentrically based foreign policy programmes 
of the United States occasioned an inimical repercussion. ‘Other nations 
laboring under a variety of handicaps, could not view free competition in the 
world’s markets with like confidence. Free competition profited the strong but 
hurt the weak’ Varg (1977:264). 
Worse still, there is evidence of a US chaperoned conglomeration of dominant 
countries that now determine the political and economic fate of the world. It is 
thus correct to infer that ‘power in the global economy increasingly has 
spread among other countries, particularly U.S. allies’ (Nye 1989:45). 
Therefore, ‘so long as inequalities remain we may expect the attacks on 
united states ‘imperialism’to continue’ (Slater 1977:13). The basis for the 
obtrusive and inimical influence of foreign policy in the workings of 
globalization lies in the fact that ‘no matter which element is important to any 
one nation’s well being or security, that element is unequally distributed 
among countries’Varg (1977:261). This is the more significant when we realize 
that materials ranging from oil, coal, population to technology and capital 
are all unequally allocated or distributed. For Varg (1977:261) ‘this 
imbalance makes interchange among nations imperative. And it is this 
interchange, international trade and finance that are central to the foreign 
relations of all. This has been true of the United States since the days of the 
founding fathers and is significantly more so today.’ 
But then without denying the significance of the above, our point is just a bit 
different. The reality of unequal endowments and the spectral consequences 
arising thereof, compel the focus on the conflict-ridden aspect of human and 
state relations in the world, as we know it. More so, beyond the relative 
availability and location of strictly economic and natural resources, it must be 
stated that even power, influence, control, and status are all credible political 
and cultural resources. All of these retain a currency that raises the stakes in 
the eternal jostling among nations for more vantage positions relative to the 
others. In the broadest possible sense, even power is an economic resource, 
where for example it draws in rents, tribute and levies from the dominated 
and even likewise ensures the immobility and thence, vulnerability and docility 
of the subjugated. Also power can become a moral issue when we query the 
basis of legitimate or illegitimate authority. 
The emphasis on the economic basis of US domination must allow for a 
clarification of the gamut of this dominance. Here, it is enough to state that the 
USA exercises two types of domination and imperialistic control: the actual 
causal control and the regulative control. This can be translated again into the 
analysis of power. As French (1995:43) has put it ‘to have power in a 
  
situation is to be able, if one wants, under certain conditions to cause an 
outcome or to prevent one from coming about.’  The desire of the US as seen 
in the description of the trajectory of US domination as globalization simply 
insinuates that it either causes things to move in the way that they do or it 
seeks to ensure either the occurrence of something or its non-occurrence. Either 
way the actual and regulative forms of US control in the world insinuate a 
proclivity to subjugate or subordinate the local and transnational forces to its 
dictates. This can only breed a defective totalitarian world order or a chaotic 
state of extreme global imbalance that will get the dominant and dominated 
mutually distressed. Such a situation may well be unfavourable in the short or 
long term. The direct consequences of such control mechanisms for US global 
political and economic conduct implies the twisting and gliding within the 
suspicious continuum of interventionism and puppeteer machinations. As an 
example, it is instructive that ‘the united states, the one remaining super power 
in the post cold war era, shows little inclination to transfer real power to any 
multinational authority that it cannot control (Resnick 1998:128-129). This may 
well be similar to the US posture of exhibiting reluctance in navigating within 
the confines of the United Nations strategies. As Beres (1982:128) rightly puts 
it ‘the result of this American policy, then, will be increasing world-wide 
instability.’ 
Another philosophically challenging issue arising from the above is the crucial 
question of the nexus between power, control and responsibility. It was Said 
(1977:38) who made the point that ‘power becomes destructive only when 
committed to the service of a narrow conception of morality. Power can be 
used for moral or immoral purposes.’  Anyone can actually retain power; even 
common criminals exercise power, howbeit cruelly and fleetingly. We also 
know that power gives rise to a sense of security. But power in itself, and the 
security that comes from it, are both equally ephemeral when such are not 
founded on a strong moral or social authority. Whereas power embodies so 
much capacity to control, yet it must bring itself to bear on the crucial issue of 
responsibility. The questions of accountability, liability and responsiveness are 
integral elements of the definition of a better conception of power and the 
control that goes with it. This is now imperative in the light of the crisis of US 
foreign policy and globalization in relation to Africa. 
It has been said that ‘power and accountability are not antithetical’ (Whitman 
2002:51). And we can ask whether, in actual fact, the US has thus far 
exercised responsible power or control in its leadership roles in the world. A 
more systematic analysis of these nuances shall be done using the dominant 
political philosophies of Plato and Hobbes in a later section of this essay. For 
now let us examine the true nature of US foreign policy (as isolationist or 
otherwise) as opposed to the basis or foundation of the same policy in 
economic motivations. This distinction is an important one for the point that we 
seek to make. It is tied to ideology and the outcomes of this. Can a truly 
liberal and capitalistic proclivity inspire or generate normative or prudential 
attitudes of care about the feelings or needs of others? Are the principles 
underlying liberalism and capitalism tolerant of the recognition and 
consideration of others? How can we review the nature and effects of the 
conduct and policies of others (terrorism, debt renunciation, etc) as strategies 
of calling for more responsibility from the global liberal ideology?  
Wright (1998:136-137) summarizes the cultural and foreign policy 
involvement of the United States in Africa in these words. ‘Overall the US 
record in Africa provides a dismal balance sheet and in terms of promoting 
development, encouraging democracy, and limiting regional conflict- US 
  
efforts in Africa failed dismally.’  The account of American disposition towards 
Africa has not changed significantly. According to Schraeder (2001:389) the 
‘neglect of Africa at the highest reaches of the US policy making 
establishment is the direct result of a president’s typical lack of knowledge 
and therefore the absence of a deep-felt interest in a region that historically 
enjoyed few enduring political links with the US, a tendency to view Africa as 
the responsibility of European powers.’  The consequence of this is that Africa 
‘will at best be marginalized by a white house team that does not perceive 
the continent as an important part of the overall international strategic 
landscape’ (Schraeder 2001:390). But this is not all to the African 
predicament. 
This trend of disregard for Africa is not a recent phenomenon. Morgenthau 
(1967:297) had also noted a long time ago, that ‘the united states has in 
Africa no specific political or military interests. America’s interests in Africa 
are a by-product of East-West struggle.’  This point is reinforced by Amin 
(2000) who says that the global strategy of the United States of America is 
based on a five point agenda, among which include the one that relates to 
Africa: ‘to marginalize the regions of the south that represent no strategic 
interest. The marginalized peripheries have neither a project nor a strategy of 
their own. Countries in this group are therefore the passive subjects of 
globalisation’ (Amin 2000:31 &29). This disdain, neglect and domination 
ensures that Africa is being ‘increasingly marginalized and subjected to the 
hegemonic control of the major actors on the world scene’ (Ibrahim 2002:3).  
This same point has also been made by Morgenthau (1967:298-299) who 
says that ‘the united states has no direct access to the problems of Africa but 
can approach them only through the intermediary of the metropolitan 
governments which control the main bulk of the territory and population of 
Africa. The interests of the metropolitan governments are not necessarily 
identical with the interests of the United States. A policy required by American 
interests in Africa taken in isolation is bound to have all kinds of repercussions 
upon the metropolitan nations. It may impair metropolitan control and run 
counter to metropolitan economic interests and thereby weaken the over-all 
power of the metropolitan nations. It may also create resentment against the 
united states.’  Obviously, there is no concern here for the needs, interests or 
future goals of Africa in this global gambit of sheer dominating and 
nonchalant display of power.  
The critical situation of Africa must be reexamined in the light of the strictures 
imposed by a predominantly US guided globalization. Africa is being 
increasingly marginalized in this context of globalization (Hammouda, 
1999:73). Why is this so? Ibrahim (2002:3) puts it to us that globalization has 
a major character which is that ‘it produces winners and losers, and in this 
context, Africa is the region of the world that is losing most from the 
globalization process.’  Castells (1998:82-83) has also noted that ‘the rise of 
informational/global capitalism has coincided with the collapse of Africa’s 
economies, the disintegration of many of its states and the break-down of 
most of its societies.’ In short, Wright (1998:133-134) rightly says that ‘the 
increased marginality of Africa is twofold -economic and politico strategic– 
and both aspects are tightly linked in their consequences. 
In an increasingly integrated world of regionalization and globalization 
where high levels of technology are paramount, Africa is lagging behind on 
all counts.’  Africa is suffering from the effects of uneven globalization. This 
marginalisation and backwardness is visible in the main areas of the 
  
operation of globalisation, namely, ‘the imposition of a global liberal policy 
agenda, rapid technological change in transport and telecommunications, and 
the growth of global financial markets. Africa has also been marginalized in 
the development of international institutions for the management of 
globalisation, which has tended to reinforce its position of economic 
disadvantage in the globalisation process’ (Meagher 2003:63)  
Furthermore, Wright (1998) says that ‘uneven globalization is not only a 
process but also an ongoing structuration of power; the popular notion of the 
world becoming one is more than anything else perhaps a description of 
hegemonization.  Globalization is the hierarchization of the world – 
economically, politically and culturally and the crystallizing of a domination.  
It is a domination constituted essentially by economic power.  Globalization 
must necessitate a rethinking, reconfiguring and reorganization of the world 
polity and culture, Globalization will affect the production, and context of 
knowledge’ (Wright, 1998: 133-134). One word that best summarizes the 
state of Africa is the idea of dependency, which insinuates that Africa and 
other ‘third world countries have become inextricably integrated in the world 
capitalist system dominated in turn by united states capitalism, as producers 
of raw materials and consumers of manufactured products. Because they are 
weak and economically undiversified, however, third world countries are 
relegated to the periphery of the system’ (Slater 1977:4). 
Thus the consequential reality of Africa’s dependency cannot be wished away. 
Though dependency theory can be analyzed in terms of certain 
methodologically distinct features, yet it is sufficient for our purpose to situate 
the role of the US in the context of African dependency. The point is that ‘the 
backward condition of most third world countries was the consequence of an 
uninterrupted and steadily intensifying process of imperialist exploitation. 
Development thus became equated with the struggle to achieve the goal of 
economic growth to the standards set by the United States’ (Drakakis-Smith 
1998:215-216). The primary task of the relegation of the African world is the 
creation and perpetuation of ‘the relations of subordination and exploitation 
prevailing in the world capitalist economy. The imperialist powers take 
advantage of this’ (Osipov and Cherkasov 1991:271). This suggests a morally 
dubious, pragmatically manipulative and socially strangulating effort to keep 
the natural resources of Africa under the control of some dominant powers.  
As James (1997:208) correctly puts it, ‘the third world is thoroughly 
integrated into, and dependent upon, the dominant modes of practice.’ 
Beyond the charge of neglect, there is the challenge of the paternalistic 
argument that ‘seems to provide justification for manipulation, exploitation, 
and coercion of others for their own good. Paternalism-the white man’s 
burden- is justified if one is doing what is best for others’ (Aiken 1982:103-
104). The overall translation of all the above is that ‘the geopolitical power 
over other societies, legitimated and codified under the signs of manifest 
destiny and civilizing missions, has been a rather salient feature of earlier 
western projects of constructing new world orders. These projects as they 
emanated from Europe or the United States, attempted to impose their 
hegemony by defining normality with reference to a particular vision of their 
own cultures’ (Slater 1996:274).  
Today, the prevalence of core negative features of human existence defines 
Africa as a prominent part of the third world. Said (1977:35) has bluntly 
stated that ‘existential conditions in the third world differ considerably from 
the west. Poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, low productivity, mass 
  
unemployment, glaring disparities in the distribution of benefits- all undermine 
the existential plight of the third world.’  The position of Africa in the world 
today is a highly disadvantaged one in the current equation of global 
geopolitics; the mention of Africa immediately brings to mind an area typified 
by colossal waste, failure and regression in the critical indices of social order, 
human well being and security. With reference to the state of sociopolitical 
life in Africa the situation has been dismal and condemnable.  The norms of 
political conduct in Africa have been the personalization of power, tyranny 
and state terrorism.  The effects of the above are, as Ake (1996:7) has rightly 
pointed out, such that Africa’s state structures are susceptible to abuse, and 
are detrimental to democracy. The internal constitution of the state nurtures 
and accredits a form of politics imbued with lawlessness.  In our view this type 
of politics can only be put in the service of personal aggrandizement and 
nepotism.  
Africa is in need of a stable and humane system that can actually guarantee 
the well-being and survival of human beings on a consistent basis.  Africa must 
be committed to the search for how a variety of particular individual 
expressions of humanity may be harmonized without domination. As Elbadawi 
(2002:567) puts it ‘globalization is expected to bring the promise of wider 
opportunities’. However, Africa is characterized by high ethnic 
fractionalization, lack of social cohesion, and weak political institutions. This 
draws attention once again to the role of viable principles and institutions of 
democracy. Thus the African situation represents a crisis of values. 
The urgent and necessary reforms that Africa requires cannot but be 
considered in the light of globalization and the determination of some 
dominant beneficial values for the development and preservation of man in 
the new millennium. It is on this basis that we can agree with Nyerere 
(1975:675) that ‘while our concern with world events is real and important, 
the events in Africa are of even greater and more direct relevance to us.’  But 
again Elbadawi (2002:567) is right to observe that ‘for Africa to turn 
globalization into a positive catalyst for its social and economic development, 
much more than economic competitiveness is required.’  Let us then approach 
some of the dominant political, ethical and normative dimensions of the 
discussion of globalization.  
 
RETHINKING GLOBAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CONDITIONS OF NEW 
ETHICAL COMMUNITY 
There is thus a global challenge of infusing human values such as social 
responsibility, justice and the common good into the debate on globalization. 
From the arguments presented earlier, it is now clear that ‘we must move 
beyond visions of a future world as essentially an extension of American 
institutions: whether political or economic’ (Billington 1986:645). As Brzezinski 
(1960:722-723) has insisted, ‘there is a growing need for more sustained 
reflection on the condition of modern man and for mutual learning process 
among the societies. It is to this newer and enormously complex task that 
American policy will have to address itself. Closer cooperation among the 
advanced industrial societies, which share certain political values in common, 
would help to create a stable core for global politics.’  If it is to be taken as 
true that the United States is in a superb position to offer moral and spiritual 
leadership to the world then such a serious and far reaching claim cannot be 
made or justified by mere verbal profession. It must be backed up by serious 
change of heart, attitude and disposition. The truth then is that ‘as world 
  
politics becomes more complex, the power of all major states to achieve their 
purposes seems to diminish. One must distinguish power over other countries 
from power over outcomes’ (Nye 1990:3). To be able to carry along others or 
at least to dissuade them from becoming a threat to our well-being, some 
recognition must be accorded to their interests. This point of recognizing the 
other is particularly important if there has been an established historical case 
of unfair treatment to the other. This is what some scholars imply in the 
demand for compensatory justice ‘the victims of exploitation deserve 
compensation for the harm they have suffered. This is true within a society as 
well as within societies’ (De George 1993:440).  Compensation is more than 
just giving back. It is better seen as seeking to redress permanently an 
imbalanced situation in view of reexamining the context of relationships. This 
implies an understanding that ‘other peoples in the world have much that is of 
worth to contribute to creating the future and have a legitimate right to do 
so’(Bell 1994:17). 
But the ethical, institutional and methodological obstacles to the 
accomplishment of the goals of attaining viable world community and global 
leadership are clear. One wave of such problems has been posed by 
Streeten (1989). “Any attempt to build cooperation for development on moral 
principles has to answer three questions. First, do the rich in a community have 
an obligation in social justice (not only in charity) to the poor? Second, does 
mankind constitute a community in the relevant sense? Third, does the 
existence of national governments not interfere with the discharge of the 
obligations of the rich?’ (Streeten 1989:1355). The answers to all three 
questions are affirmative. The real context of the exploitations and injustices 
that paved the way for the creation of wealth in America and other 
metropolitan states raises a historical and phenomenological question of social 
justice. This question has gained more significance in the modern world that is 
increasingly plagued by crisis both natural and man-made that have 
threatened all and spared none. To overcome these historical and global 
social exigencies there must be a collapse of the dominant boundaries of the 
world, so that a positive globalization can take effect for the global good.  
The challenges, forms and process of globalization, define the urgent task 
confronting man in terms of seeking better ways of appropriating the 
available global resources for the overall security and well-being of peoples. 
In order to realize this task, it is important to examine the values or value 
system of human social life in terms of their universal character and goals. 
What are the means for the improvement of the human situation? There are 
fundamental questions about the conditions for entrenching actions directed at 
the public interest or collective good in the society.  This point is most 
significant in relation to the US that is taken as the global leader. Helleiner 
(2002:539) re-emphasizes that the role of the rest of the world or the 
international community in the rectification of the African situation depends on 
a responsibility ‘to make the global economy function efficiently, equitably, 
and in a reasonably stable fashion.’  As such, the sustenance of a just and 
viable global political-economic community depends on each group having a 
responsibility for the well being of others as well as the recognition that the 
well being of individual states are inextricably tied to the global collective 
well being. The central value that the global community ought to pursue is the 
realization that the common good always takes precedence over the pursuit 
of individual ends. The good of all the members of the community 
presupposes some shared understanding of the requirements of justice and 
  
human rights necessary for proper living in the community and society. The 
affirmation of common justice and fairness can only be attained when some 
notion of solidarity is accepted.  The need for peaceful cohabitation among 
men compels the quest for solidarity, understood as the establishment for 
conditions for conscious mutual cooperation and responsibility between the 
society and its members. The idea of the ‘common “good” is attached to 
objects and policies that are beneficial to the whole taken 
collectively’ (Schochet, 1979:24).  
We must seek the relative theoretical and practical merit of a position such as 
that of the liberal idealists that we need a ‘broad ethical consensus that 
international politics should be conducted, not with the aim of maximizing the 
national interest but in order to enable mankind to live in a community of 
mutual tolerance and respect, settling its differences rationally, resolving its 
conflicts by peaceful means’(Howard 1977:367).  In order to achieve justice, 
we must seek social reform and economic redistribution (Wollheim 1958:230).  
Kymlicka (1999:173) holds that we need to focus on the wider context of 
solidarity.  In our quest for ties that bind there is the question of social justice, 
community and fraternity. Social unity depends on shared values. Such values 
may include: belief in equality and fairness; belief in consultation and 
dialogue; the importance of accommodation and tolerance; support for 
diversity, compassion and generosity; commitment to freedom, peace, non-
violent change and social justice. These values are to operate at the global 
and national levels. 
According to Nielsen (1996:85) social justice deals with how social institutions 
are to be arranged, as well as, how just social institutions can be established. 
On her part, Young (1990:15-16) maintains that the central concern of social 
justice is to eliminate institutionalized domination and oppression. The point 
made by St Thomas Aquinas (1990:51-52) is significant here.  He holds that 
social justice directs human actions to the common good. Therefore, the 
function of justice is to establish rectitude in various kinds of exchanges and 
again in distributions. Mill (1990:302) holds that justice arises from the fact of 
living in the society, and it renders it indispensable that each person should be 
bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest.  In this case, it 
requires that individuals must recognize the personhood of others and their 
rights to have a secure and worthwhile existence.  The application of the rules 
of justice ensures that human-beings can live with dignity, freedom and 
responsibility. The synchronization of interests as the central focus of social 
justice and order predicates itself on a concept of mutuality or the 
appreciation of reciprocal obligations.  Reciprocity is important because it 
aims at populating the just society with reasonable persons retaining feelings 
that reinforce interrelated actions among persons. This is the challenge of 
community. What kind of community can be established through the principle 
of social justice?   
Etzioni (1995:13) recommends that we endorse a sense of responsive 
community in which the individuals will accept that they are members of one 
another; that people are ontologically embedded in social existence.  For him, 
this means that everything that members value including liberty, is dependent 
on sustaining the social realm-which embodies a measure of commitment to the 
common interest.  Mandelbaum (1988:21) suggests that the quest for a deep 
community will require that members be socialized to live within a communal 
identity and a history. According to Selznick (1995:33-34) community is 
suggestive of solidarity based on consciousness of kind. Therefore, we must 
  
move the quest for a solution forward by realizing and admitting that 
‘responsibility is ascribed to collectives (nations, groups, etc) as well as to 
individual persons’ (Cooper 1968:258).  Our lives will make more sense only 
in the context of what Struhl (1976:158) refers to as ‘a community of human 
beings who value each other and who recognize each other as ends in 
themselves.  This mutual respect will create a community of mature, creative 
and self regulating human beings’ in order to allow for growth. Jeter (2003) 
has insisted that ‘if we are deceived into concentrating on our differences and 
not common interests then enmity and rivalry will trespass where hope and 
cooperation should prevail’.  The members of society cannot achieve the 
peace, security and progress of each and all unless they establish a clear and 
effective system of social justice.  
If these normative requirements are accepted as crucial for the reconstruction 
of global justice and the redefinition of global leadership construct then we 
must agree with Koch (1958: 166) who holds that ‘political issues today 
literally force us to deal with values.  Professional philosophers in the 
twentieth century have indeed manifested a great interest in the exploration 
and, critique or reconstruction of value theory.’  The world is now urgently in 
need of ‘social cooperation and coordination of human activities which is the 
essence of civilized life’(Harris 1957:1). As Waldron (1988:732) rightly notes 
there are some moral and religious commitments that cannot be pursed 
individualistically, but only by people acting together. Leadership and peace 
in the world are issues such that require joint action for the common good. This 
draws attention to the question of duties. Feinberg (1966:137) points out that 
we have duties, which we owe to people and society.  Such duties are 
obligations that must be seen holistically. This implies the concern that people 
have for ‘much more than improved material conditions and the respect for 
human rights. They want to be masters of their society, to liberate themselves 
from fundamental economic alienation’ (Amin 1998:155).  
We must agree with Bertsch et al (1991:488) who argue that the values that 
are central to the redemption of the African life are those that raise the level 
of human dignity.  These include the provision of goods and services, 
mitigation of inequality, greater national cohesion and harmony. It is 
instructive to note that ‘human dignity begins in the minds of human 
beings’ (Bertsch 1991:547). Thus seen from a strictly positive view, ‘American 
power provides the possibilities to overcome the despair of the third world. 
American power can serve such foreign policy goals as the development of 
harmonious interaction between man and nature and the promotion of human 
solidarity’ (Said 1977:38).   
We must agree that it is now expedient that ‘the united states needs to be 
forthright in asserting its values of openness and human rights, for American 
influence rests not only on military and economic might but also on 
values’ (Nye 1989:47). The values that are at stake are those that can 
facilitate the dual positive goals of promoting the overall good of the 
different regions of the world and also promoting the character of viable 
global leadership of the US. If this is so then ‘the tasks facing the U.S. foreign 
policy during this transition are similarly great. But we have to recognize that 
an important revolution is underway in the world, and that in that revolution, 
ideas count’ (Fukuyama 1990:11). Ideas can only take root of there is a 
substrate of values to undergird these. Both values and ideas that operate in 
conjunction must be subject to a conceptual clarification. The normative basis 
of a global existent or world community is irrevocably dependent on 
  
valuation and ideational bases. We must now emphasize the idea of just 
globalization, which recognizes the interdependence of the world and realizes 
that many of the problems existing in the world today are, necessarily, shared 
problems and can be tackled by complementary action.  
It has become imperative that in seeking a more sustainable and fair global 
development, there must be a link-up between globalization and justice in 
order to ensure that all parts of the world benefit. The need to promote social 
justice and global responsibility would appear to be more urgent than ever as 
we become more acutely aware of the limited nature of the world’s natural 
resources and the need for sustainable development. The great task before 
humanity today is to transmit, among  societies, more humane, just and 
progressive value systems and social orders through which they can more 
easily realize their fullest personal and social development in atmospheres of 
dignity, responsibility and security. This globalization initiative, if it is not to go 
the way of earlier versions of colonialism must incline man towards the 
affirmation and enhancement of universal, enduring, humane and progressive 
values of human personal and social life.  And the ultimate goals of this 
renewed quest for values are to bring man to a more dignified level of life, 
and to ensure that higher values such as justice and peace become more 
easily the norms of conduct among men. 
As things stand, the preceding analysis serves to establish the need for an 
international moral order that focuses on the ‘importance of values such as 
democracy, freedom and justice, and the importance of agreement about the 
meaning of values in many lands and among many peoples’ (Bell 1994:18).  
Toure (1975:671) makes the most direct demand in respect of the thrust of a 
viable foreign policy. This is to ‘achieve harmony between the living conditions 
of all peoples on earth’ (Toure 1975:671). We must agree with Tsanoff 
(1951:14) that ‘the attainment of an international morality is the greatest 
need of our time. We require further expansion of ethical insight.’  The 
primary basis of the establishment of a new global philosophy lies in the 
struggle to, among other things, redefine the context of good leadership on 
the part of the USA.  
The struggle to overcome the poverty of leadership must necessitate the 
rediscovery of fuller global meanings to lesser local actions. That is, the 
situation of as large a number as possible needs to be considered within the 
global order. There is also the issue of the maintenance of basic moral 
credentials and accountability. It is clear that the future path of viable and 
acceptable US foreign policy lies in the quest for a genuine desire and effort 
to consider the interest of others especially the marginal or vulnerable 
peoples and nations of the world. It is only on this condition that there can be 
mutually assured survival and peace for all to benefit from. 
 
VALUES AND VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE RE-FORMATION OF A SYSTEM OF 
JUSTICE  
This crisis of justice seems to be the outcome of putatively defective values 
and value systems, which elicit the cultural and cosmological factors in the 
debate on the rough justice triggered by traditionalism, modernisation and 
dependency. Given the cultural implications of the establishment of just 
relations within and outside Africa, we surmise that values lie at the core of 
  
our problems. This seems difficult in Africa, due to the problem of a proper 
idea of justice that can underwrite the ideological fashioning of viable nation-
states (political justice) and the implications of inequalities and domination in 
the international social-political dynamics (politics of justice) that have had 
consequential impacts on the developmental processes in Africa. This dual 
challenge has compelled the re-interrogation of the role of the human person 
in the singular task of development.  
The facilitation of the development of a philosophy of political justice and an 
understanding of the international politics of justice that can make a 
difference in the African developmental crisis compels the creation of images 
of a future based upon the cherished ideals, visions and values of security, 
stability, peace, morality and democracy. It will enhance the capacity of the 
African societies or states to ensure justice as a primal condition for the 
definition and articulation of social order.  In the historical survey of the 
literature an important goal of justice is to achieve the security, protection, 
safety, defense and preservation of the lives and property of people in a 
society. It will ensure the protection of lives and property as the central goal 
of social order because society cannot survive for long in any meaningful 
sense if the safety of life and property is not maintained. The proper 
allocation of power, goods, duties and burdens among the members of a 
society will ensure that everyone has some stake or interest in the society 
which induces him/her to strive for individual and collective security and 
protection. 
The study of global and local political justice will ensure the duties and 
benefits that accrue from effective social co-existence among people. The co-
existence of any group or community of people requires some level of just 
conduct and friendly feelings shared among them. Such friendly feelings 
facilitate mutual cooperation, communal rapport and integrated activities.  
These friendly feelings also help to manage and control inevitable differences 
of opinion and interest that can arise out of communal co-habitation.  It is 
impossible for people to live conveniently together within a community if 
justice and morality is absent. It will assist in clarifying the convoluted 
character of the state in modern Africa. Taken together, these expected 
outcomes will serve the work of genuine development understood as the 
construction of a truly human society (Goulet 1987:166).    Development will 
be shown as impossible outside a system of social justice which aims at a 
pattern of fair treatment for people: defined according to certain principles 
of equitable, fair and humane distribution of benefits and burdens.  Justice 
makes sense as the attempt to reconcile opposing views and desires, and the 
intention to work out a free, fair, beneficial and equitable means of 
producing and sharing social goods.   
The whole question of how to make democracy more attuned to justice is a 
crucial problem that has challenged virtually all democracies in human history. 
Since democracy is a human production, it is fraught with all the problems 
arising from social conduct in a human environment. According to Weinberger 
(1994:5) ‘the fact that human beings live together in institutions has two 
psycho-social correlations for human beings: first, the fact that we live within a 
framework of expectations, and second, the fact that we cannot help asking 
questions about practical values, i.e., morality and justice.’  Larry Diamond 
(1990: 26) has put it directly that ‘democracy will not be valued by the 
people unless it deals effectively with social and economic problems and 
achieves a modicum of order and justice.’  As Indabawa (1998:149-150) has 
  
stated ‘democracy demands among other things social (distributive justice) in 
the economy, a culture of rational dialogue [for] the satisfaction of social 
needs.’  The truth however is that justice in a democratic setting must 
commence from the point of view of negotiation, bargaining and dialogue. 
But rather than describing or analyzing what these stand for, it is enough and 
preferable to state why these are foundations of justice in a democracy.  
Continuous dialogue as a committed struggle for justice is based on other 
major assumption of the democratic order. Incidentally, this has to do with 
toleration of the free exercise of human ability, the release of human 
potential in the areas of social organization and technological control. Justice 
is also necessary in so far as there must be separation of functions, duties, 
roles and responsibilities in a democratic society. This implies the strongest 
affirmation of social order where each person shall be allowed to make those 
contributions and commitments that will ensure his/her own personal survival 
and at the same time contribute to the growth of society. Beyond these, justice 
is required, and justified by the fact that democracy affirms the lack of 
monopoly of knowledge. If there is no monopoly of knowledge or ideas, then 
others must be listened to in order to preserve our self-interest and the 
interests of others. This is simple justice: The recognition of our limits and the 
implications of these for events that impact on the self and others. Thus it is 
clear that the construction of social life depends on the mutual interplay of 
peoples and forces. The on-going work of justice is the work of cooperation 
and planning for the common good as defined by a social contract, charter 
group, constitution or a visionary leader. Justice in democracy is the 
affirmation of human beings’ perpetual will to learn from each other. 
Justice is possible in a democracy because of the assumption that people are 
not just capable of being responsible to themselves (freedom and opportunity 
for the release of potential), but also that they can be responsible to others 
(recognizing fair play, integrity and rectitude within specific roles and 
obligations). In any case, the conception of justice that democracy upholds 
comes form a conception of equality requiring the universal respect for all 
human beings irrespective of genealogy or cosmology.  Raphael (1979:144-
145) is clear on the fact that ‘a notion of equality of some sort must figure in 
any concept of justice, but it figures most prominently in the democratic of 
justice’(Raphael 1979:144-145).  Central to democratic justice is the 
assumption that ‘the inherent nexus between freedom and equality is 
conveyed in the common phrase equality of opportunity. What distinguishes 
the democratic state from all the others is that its justice consists in the pursuit 
of equality-freedom’ (Lipson 1986:13-15).  
This idea and ideal of equality translates into practical results when we derive 
a sense of allowing individuals and groups the social opportunity to exercise 
their autonomy positively and legitimately. Berger (1984:3-4) has rightly 
stated that ‘this understanding means that the individual has a capacity for 
freedom, for realizing himself in the course of his actions, so the autonomous 
individual is not only an idea but a lived experience’ (Berger 1984:3-4). It 
can be surmised therefore that the freedoms of individuals that a conception 
of democracy upholds are major instruments for attaining justice. The aim of 
freedom as justice is to pursue vigorously the well being and improvement of 
people in society. More than that, the justice principle construed 
democratically is a statement about the advantages to be realized by 
allowing people to determine themselves, and relate with the world based on 
morals and reason. 
  
Democratic justice or the justice of democracy is based on an assumption 
about human nature that where people fail to be affected by the dictates of 
the natural sentiments of justice, then institutional mechanisms of justice must 
prevail to allow the recognition that there are other people in the society or 
the world and that there must be a humane and equitable way of relating to 
others.  To a large extent therefore, the justice that democracy upholds is an 
attempt to insist on the social nature of the democratic cosmology, with its 
deep implications for joint actions, spirit of sharing, denials of monopoly and 
thence, the call for constant learning, cooperation and the humility that goes 
with this. Justice in a democracy is nothing other than the insistence on a 
distributive justice pattern that emphasizes the reallocation of duties, roles, 
responsibilities and benefits for the collective survival and progress. If 
democratic justice establishes anything at all, it is that no one person can do 
everything alone, thus the need to relate with others and to work out the best 
possible strategies for getting the best out of different individuals and groups, 
so as to ensure a stable and viable social order that will work for the good of 
all or at least that of the majority. Thus Stankiewicz (1976:41) is right to say 
that ‘the norms of public interest must also be specifically adapted to the 
democratic order [and] democracy’s two fundamental premises- 
egalitarianism and individualism’ (Stankiewicz 1976:41). 
It becomes clear therefore that the idea of justice promoted by democracy is 
one that depends not just on cooperation and individual contribution, but also 
on the concept of law. The rule of justice as law in a democracy is a demand 
for discipline, efficiency and propriety in human personal and institutional 
conduct. The sense of responsibility embedded in these expectations ‘is both 
political and moral’ (Kaplan 1982: 206). Mansfield (1995:32) has put it most 
directly that ‘democratic governments need responsible citizens as much as 
they need honest politicians’. The rule of justice and law or law as justice in a 
democracy is physically embodied in the concepts of obedience to, and 
supremacy of the constitution and constitutional rights, respect for the rule of 
law, and clear requirements of the separation of powers. Justice in a 
democracy is the non-negotiable ordinance requiring the creation of the 
widest possible opportunities for social members to define themselves and 
make their positive contributions to the common good and social security within 
legal and legitimate boundaries. This step will facilitate the optimal or 
optimum development of talents, gifts, abilities and opportunities within a 
social framework of generally accepted values.  
If the democratic society or state is to be taken as just then certain social 
conditions must be met. These conditions can be summarized in the idea of 
opportunity as earlier stated in this section. But what are then the practical 
implications of opportunity?  As Nathan Glazer (1981:13-14) has rightly 
suggested, social justice cannot be separated from the possibilities of 
increasing education, employment and housing. There is also the question of 
how to overcome constitutional abuses, segregation and discrimination. While 
we agree that the justice question must address these issues, we note that in 
Africa, the contents and contexts of the above features are varied and 
consequential. Apart from the real benefits of housing for protection and 
safety, the roles of education and employment in facilitating enlightenment, 
social mobility and civility, there is the collective advantage of enabling 
people to make a decisive attempt to change their situations. We also know 
that democracy in a developing African society must give priority to justice 
due to the insidious and invidious effects of ethnicity, which has unleashed 
insecurity, hatred, corruption, violence nepotism, mayhem, incompetence, 
bestiality and retrogression.  
  
Given the crisis of democracy in a developing society, we must revisit the 
question of morality and its lessons for the construction of justice in a 
democracy. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997:11) has put it to us that ‘democracy is 
above all a moral value or imperative, that is, a permanent aspiration of 
human beings for freedom, for a better social and political order, one that is 
more human and more or less egalitarian’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1997:11).  
According to Dewey (1966:358) morality is social.  This is seen in the fact that 
intelligence becomes one’s own only when it is consciously used and there is an 
acceptance of the responsibility for exercising it.  The fact that human beings 
operate under social influences suggests that both the approval and 
disapproval of actions are facts within society.  Thus, morals are a matter of 
the human person’s interaction with his/her environment. We can agree with 
Cammack (1997) that we need to focus on those attitudes, values and 
resulting patterns of behavior that are shared and conducive to political 
stability. In establishing the linkage between personality and nation building, 
the is ‘extreme importance of non-objective considerations such as political 
relations, psychological attitudes and cultural values’ (Cammack, 1997:93-94) 
in the clarification and resolution or our problems.  
Cammack (1997:95) goes further to state that ‘in transitional society the 
processes of basic socialization, political socialization and recruitment to 
political roles tended to lack coherence and give rise to crisis of identity.  In 
such societies, uncertainty and lack of trust would proliferate’ (Cammack 
1997:95). The present life provides us with lively experiences: We encounter 
new problems and seek to solve them; we seek to improve our lives; we seek 
to determine the rightness, or appropriateness of our acts; we need to focus 
on the consequences of our actions and seek to correct errors and make 
adjustments.  Bertsch (1991:488) argues that the values that are central to the 
redemption of the African life are those that raise the level of human dignity. 
These include the provision of goods and services, mitigation of inequality, 
greater national cohesion and harmony.  Bertsch (1991:547) argues that 
‘human dignity begins in the minds of human beings.’ 
Therefore, democracy will begin to make more sense when it is linked to 
justice.  In addition to attaining the ideals of political and legal equality, 
genuine democracy also strives to attain some form of social and economic 
equality as allowed by defined and generally accepted criteria and 
standards of just distribution of social resources and wealth.  Justice 
presupposes the equality of all persons in a social system and demands a 
recognition of the worth and contribution of each person to the community’s 
pool of social goods.  Thus, if democracy is to be meaningful and productive, 
it must admit of some social recognition and economic rights or empowerment.  
Democracy can never thrive in an atmosphere of inequality and deprivation.  
We have tried to establish the real consequences of the gap between 
democracy and the institutional demands of social justice, which is prevalent in 
a developing society, and is central to the redefinition of democratic 
theorizing.  We showed that the redefinition of the wider basis of political 
morality and the reconstruction of the trajectories of power are central to the 
restoration of the African strategies for democratic consolidation.  In the 
search for a solution, the work has argued that the marginality inherent in 
democratic practice triggers the inability to articulate the idea and vision of 
the state as a vector of political mobilization, economic well-being and social 
rectification.  The idea has been to make an impact by showing the 
fundamental conditions for conceptualization of viable democracy and to 
insinuate that we can achieve this by action directed at the collective good.  
  
This point is most significant in relation to those in governance.  
Social justice among other things demands the establishment of institutions and 
rules of fair competition for social benefits and the equality of opportunity for 
every individual or group to develop his or her capabilities and talents to the 
optimum. We reiterate that the establishment of a system of social and 
effective justice is of immense importance, especially to the multi-ethnic nation-
states of Africa. In the context of Africa therefore, ‘the central core of the 
idea of justice is the exclusion of arbitrariness and more particularly the 
exclusion of arbitrary power’ (Ginsberg 1963:109).  If this repudiation of 
arbitrariness is an imperative, and if really, we cannot escape from the 
current quagmires occasioned by a miasma of invidious cosmological 
traditionalism and foreign induced Postcolonialism in the African justice 
agenda, then we must face a conception of justice that is not ‘blind to 
particular subjects. Quite the contrary, it looks to those who stand before her 
and demands from us the response which is appropriate for them’ (Carr 
1981:224). The crucial question then is; is it possible to have ‘a social order 
built around a particular notion of merit’(Daniels 1978:206)? 
What, if any, are the practical action-intervention strategies of our sustained 
theorizing on justice for development in Africa? It is important to note that the 
institution of justice operative within the humane and viable social order must 
proceed beyond the guarantee of fair competition and the equality of 
opportunities, as the rules of social interaction. In addition, the social order 
must give adequate consideration to the fulfillment of the social and economic 
needs of the people. In other words, there must be a conscious attempt within 
the society to reduce social and economic deprivation among the generality 
of the people so as to guarantee the greater peace and stability of the 
African social orders. Given the fact that there can be no stable social order 
in a society where the economic situation of the majority of the citizens is 
dismal and restrictive, then the alternate social order postulated for Africa’s 
development has an important task of alleviating the economic inadequacies 
of its citizens. In this regard, it makes little sense to uphold the formal equality 
of political rights, when there are widespread economic inequalities and social 
disempowerment.  
Hence, it should be emphasized that genuine and enduring justice cannot be 
realized in its true form, unless those critical issues bordering on economic 
administration and distributions are taken into consideration. It is true then that 
justice is at the heart of ‘determining what constitutes the human good. Justice 
would then have to be what a governing power ought to command with a 
view to the realization of the good of the citizens. However, a controlling 
power can hardly by itself secure the well being of the citizens. A large part 
of the well being of individuals can only be secured by their own 
efforts’ (Mackenzie 1963:155). This means that we must seek justice for Africa 
in a type of social order that allows individuals to choose and appreciate the 
things that are of value to them. Such a conception must repudiate the 
tripartite defective traditionalist, western and modern African views of justice 
in their perverted forms. Definitely an acceptable philosophy of justice for 
Africa must clearly have as its directing principle what Young (1990:15) 
rightly says is ‘the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression’ 
  
which manifests in a plethora of ways in the endemic educational lapses, 
dismal unemployment, cruel marginalization of minorities, elite corruption and 
profligacy, the ascendancy of poverty and the entrenchment of lawlessness, 
insecurity and anomie. The truth is that a lot of these occurrences are 
unnecessary and unacceptable given the resources (human, natural and 
financial) available to most African nations. Also we begin to be strident in 
our call when we come to the vital realization that social transformation and 
normative rectification have become imperatives of African destiny and 
survival in the global arena.     
To foster a new idea of justice we must come to terms with one of the modern 
institutions necessary for the establishment of just social order which is the 
Constitution. It is crucial for the establishment of social order for the following 
reasons. Every viable and just social order requires a legal and authoritative 
document, which spells out the basis of, and rules guiding all social activities. It 
outlines the fundamental principles and laws that are to guide the 
administration of national life. It is therefore the expression of the 
fundamental agreement of the society on the way individuals, groups and the 
society are to be governed. It is a statement about how the burdens and 
benefits of social cooperation and concessions are to be determined. Also, the 
constitution establishes social order by defining or better still, limiting the 
authority and power of government, leaving to it that which is minimally 
required to be effective in pursuing the common good without stultifying the 
well-being of any group or the society. It emphasizes the separation of 
powers and ensures that political authority is restrained by a system of checks 
and balances. By so doing, it reduces the fear and possibility of arbitrary and 
absolute power being concentrated in the hands of any one person or group. 
Thus, the constitution stresses the importance of rights, individual freedom and 
devolution of authority for the sustenance of social order. 
The need for a constitution arises because there should be a generally 
accepted system of social interaction, which will guide the harmonization of 
the diverse interests of competing groups in a society. The constitution seeks to 
define what is right or proper by creating a system of laws based on the 
demands of justice and freedom. It is thus construed as the positive political 
morality of a nation, which ensures the obedience of the citizens to moral 
principles. It should however be noted, that the constitution in itself, no matter 
how well written, cannot by itself establish viable social order. Rather, it 
requires the active participation of those human beings who will uphold, and 
live out its dictates. Therefore, there is a link between the constitution, good 
government or leadership, and the society. The institution of leadership is of 
crucial importance to the sustenance of social order. 
Many nations in Africa suffer a crisis of justice and social order due to the 
effects of bad and inept leadership arising from a warped conception of 
power. This fact underscores the importance of purposeful leadership for 
good democratic governance and the maintenance of viable social order.  
The kind of leadership required for the establishment and sustenance of a 
stable and productive social order is one which exhibits foresight, vision, a 
clear sense of purpose, and charisma. Such qualities of good leadership are 
important in the efforts to establish a social order that is peaceful, secure and 
human. Also, such leadership will serve as the nucleus, which motivates, directs 
  
and controls the social, economic and political activities of the society. More 
importantly, the kind of leadership, which is relevant to the establishment of a 
viable social order, must be one that is based on the free choice of the 
citizens. 
There must be a free and fair choice of leaders and administrators in a 
genuine social order. This fact demonstrates the significance of democracy as 
a major instrument for the establishment of social order. Democracy entails the 
free and voluntary choice of leaders who have been elected in a peaceful 
and organized manner, to manage the affairs of the society. The democratic 
procedure of choosing these leaders endows them with the legitimacy and 
sovereignty to rule on behalf of the members of the society. Furthermore, 
good leadership is demonstrated through good governance, which is itself 
very important for the sustenance of social order because it demands 
accountability of officials for public funds. It also demands transparency in 
government procedures and decisions. It demands predictability through 
rational governmental action. And it demands openness, so that there can be 
free and reliable flow of information necessary for economic and social 
activity. Furthermore, good governance as a mark of purposeful and humane 
leadership demands the establishment of an independent judiciary, a free 
press and an efficient public service. It also demands the establishment of a 
pluralistic institutional structure and the respect for the law and human rights. 
However, it can be argued that even if leadership is a necessary condition for 
social order and social transformation, it is not a sufficient condition. In other 
words, no matter the good intentions, humaneness and purposefulness of a 
leadership, it will not be able to establish justice and social order except core 
social and humane vision and values become institutionalized in the society. 
How then can the core social values and visions be institutionalized in the 
society? There are two major ways through which core values and visions of 
justice and humaneness can be institutionalized. The first way is through the 
use of formal institutions or arrangements of political power and 
administration. The second way or method of institutionalizing social values 
and visions is thought the use of informal institutions. Furthermore, the visions 
and values can be institutionalized through the use of informal arrangements 
such as political parties, professional bodies, voluntary associations, the 
media, youth movements and traditional leadership structures. The combined 
forces of these social segments must return to the fundamental ways and 
imperatives of effort, industry, conscientiousness and general application of 
themselves to the works of creativity, intelligence and innovation if justice is to 
prevail across Africa. What kinds of tasks confront the institutions and 
structures directed at attaining justice in Africa? We can identify some major 
axiological and legislative commitments of these core social institutions and 
then present their task in a more theoretical manner. These structures and 
institutions that can be identified and discussed must be put in the ‘service of 
human dignity’ (Lasswell 1956:90) understood in its widest sense as the 
creation of opportunities for well being, self respect, progress and civilized 




 SOME URGENT TASKS CONFRONTING THESE INSTITUTIONS AND 
STRUCTURES: POWER STRUCTURES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUSTICE 
IN AFRICA  
Burns (1981:5) states that ‘the toughest and most central question in American 
politics and political science is the question of power.’  The same is applicable 
to Africa.  It is clear from current happenings that the whole question of power 
and its management can be said to be central to the question of justice in 
Africa. We are talking about political power here, which seems to yield other 
kinds of power in Africa. The traditional view of power refers to the ‘ability to 
get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done’ (Goldstein 
1999:55).  While we don’t have any grouse with this conception of power, we 
are more interested in the idea of power as a value. To this effect, 
‘participation in the making of decisions (power) is a value. We are interested 
in the interrelation of power with personality and the whole social 
process’ (Lasswell 1956:93).  Furthermore, we are concerned about the way 
by which a person or group with power can be made to act justly or see the 
need for doing so. If this is so, then we are interested in how power can be 
negotiated or made to serve the interest of higher and positive values or 
goals. In this sense, we are interested in the idea of ‘power as domination, as 
the ability to control or command’ (Litke 1992: 176).  There is a profound 
connection between power and justice.  As Morgenthau (1974) puts it, ‘the 
object of somebody’s power opposes that status in the name of justice, and 
the holder of power justifies it, also in the name of justice. The real issue arises 
between power and its victim or between power and power, each claiming 
justice for its cause’ (Morgenthau 1794: 163&166).  This turbulent aspect of 
power is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges facing Africans in their 
quest for justice.  The factor of human nature and the critical possibilities for 
perversion that arise from the real challenge of a negative use of power in 
Africa, must be situated against the backdrop of the reality of conflicts and 
imbalances that power relations either serve to exacerbate or mitigate.  
According to Soyinka (in the work A Climate of Fear, Lecture2: power and 
freedom 2004) the factor of power is ‘a motivating component of human 
personality.  It is the ancestral adversary of human freedom’, seeking to 
control and dominate the other. Most personalities and institutions that have 
been vectors of power in Africa have persistently surrendered to domination, 
authoritarianism and even outright tyranny and despotism. The theme of 
domination has been emphasized as one of the most popular extremes of the 
exercise of power. According to Partridge (1963: 118) ‘it is a defining 
characteristic of the situation that the one man is compelled to surrender his 
own desires or interests, to yield without any compensation to those of the 
power-holder.’  Such a crisis-ridden conception of power inevitably throws up 
a regime of turbulence. We must seek to develop an alternative conception of 
power as directed towards service to the other or society. The psychological, 
cultural and institutional underpinning of these problems cannot be 
overemphasized.  Young (1994:88) has noted that given the fact of the 
corruptive tendencies reposed in power ‘one of the secrets of a good society 
is that power should always be open to criticism.’  In fact, the crux of the 
negotiation with power is to ‘moderate the power of the rulers over the 
ruled’ (Scott 1992:122). 
The question of the extent to which human nature is altered by deprivations 
and dehumanisation becomes important, given the increase in the tendency to 
  
abuse power even when there is no evident need for it, or perhaps, when the 
circumstances seem inauspicious. The immanent loss of control in the face of the 
temptations of power are quite unprecedented.  Put practically, the inordinate 
lust to dominate, defy others (persons, institutions and ideas) remains 
pronounced in Africa and compels a reconstructive analysis of the concept. 
This is significant when we realize that core institutions such as education may 
not have fully mitigated these negative propensities in people.  In so far as 
power is connected to capabilities, then we must establish the minimum fact 
that power must be subservient to moderation through institutional checks and 
balances, educational formation, that will hopefully, prevent arrogance, 
failure, oppression and injustices that really seem to be overwhelming a 
number of African societies.  
Africans and African societies, having seen the substantial failings of their 
traditionalist restrictive cosmologies and the dogged efforts to entrench 
modern versions of vestigial domination, must seek to persistently mitigate and 
control the access to, duration of, and use of power. For instance, it is clear 
that most African constitutions need to move away from the overbearing 
presidential system of power, that has allowed the possibility of so much 
abuse. The presidential system of power, understood in terms of the American 
model was installed specifically, to serve their own unique purposes of 
allowing one man or a group, irrefutable mastery over known and unknown 
natural and social forces prevailing in an environment. Such a system will 
further reinforce the condensation of destructive power in the hands of one 
man, who is already defended by an anachronistic and authoritarian 
traditional culture. 
Unfortunately, the state-centrism of most African societies has made the bulk 
of the people too dependent on the state, and therefore on whoever controls 
the machinery of the state. In many cases, such persons have exhibited some 
of the worst tendencies in human nature.  They have represented the worst 
that Africa can produce. This situation has raised further questions about the 
ways by which choices can be made as to who will be allowed access to 
power.  Presently, in many parts of Africa, power seems to circulating among 
the old, redundant and corrupt elites, who have continually failed their 
different peoples and societies. The mismanagement of power has led to 
some of the most protracted conflicts and endemic injustices in the history of 
modern Africa. Let us recall the different contexts, and consequences of the 
mismanagement of power in Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Zaire, Central 
Africa Republic, at various times in the histories of those countries. Where 
state centrism works one any have no serious objections to its practice. But has 
it really ever worked? Where it does not work, then, the critical failings of the 
system come into full glare. In addition to its many shortcomings, state centrism 
evidently, does not permit the free exercise of human genius, the blossoming 
of subsidiary institutions. In short, we can agree with Mackenzie (1963:155) 
who says that ‘a little reflection, however, suffices to show that a controlling 
power can hardly by itself secure the well being of the citizens. A large part 
of the well being of individuals can only be secured by their own efforts. 
Thence, there is a need to create alternative structures for decentralizing and 
countervailing the power consolidating institutions in Africa. To this effect, the 
role of the civil society groups, political parties, legislative bodies, organized 
trade unions and other interest groups, where properly organized and 
uncorrupted, can be useful. But we are faced with the fundamental question of 
the rules and processes of their formation, and the question of whether their 
goals are directed at some specific end or for that matter, the realization of 
  
the common good. A vital issue however, is the expediency or otherwise of 
forming and sustaining such groups. Experience seems to suggest that rights 
and justice claims are taken more seriously in Africa, if these are articulated 
and pursued under the platform of groups, whether artificial or primordial. 
Pritchard draws our attention to a wider conception of political power that 
goes beyond ‘the ability to make and enforce decisions about matters of 
social and political importance’(Pritchard 1979:26) to the whole question of 
political influence or ‘the ability to prevent matters from becoming objects of 
decision in the first place’(Pritchard 1979:26). In the case of power in Africa, 
there is a need to work out sustained strategies for ensuring that only credible 
and moral persons do have access to, and use of power at the most important 
levels. Such efforts will impact on the redefinition of values and value systems 
and value frameworks, understood as the things that (should) interest us, the 
socially possible and accepted ways of achieving these objects of interest, 
and the kinds of institutions that can facilitate or hinder the attainment of these 
interests.  
Furthermore, the philosophically challenging issues arising from the above 
analysis remain crucial to the question of the nexus between power, control 
and responsibility. Said (1977:38) has made the point that ‘power becomes 
destructive only when committed to the service of a narrow conception of 
morality. Power can be used for moral or immoral purposes.’  Anyone can 
actually retain power; even common criminals exercise power, howbeit, 
cruelly and fleetingly. We also know that power gives rise to a sense of 
security. But power in itself, and the security that comes from it, are both 
equally ephemeral when such are not founded on a strong moral or social 
authority, and the desire to employ such for good. Whereas power embodies 
so much capacity to control, yet it must bring itself to bear on the crucial issue 
of responsibility. The questions of accountability, liability and responsiveness 
are integral elements of the definition of a more viable conception of power 
and the control that goes with it. It has been said that ‘power and 
accountability are not antithetical’ (Whitman 2002:51). We can ask whether 
the exercise of responsible power is a prevalent feature in Africa?  The 
question of power is undoubtedly tied to ideology and its outcomes. Justice in 
Africa, which requires a renegotiation of the power issue, is all the more 
important, when we note that ‘the social cooperation and coordination of 
human activities, which is the essence of civilized life, is not possible without 
regulation’ (Harris 1957:1). Such regulation can only come from a negotiated, 
humane and progressive conception of power directed at the common good. 
Dialogue is an instrument for deciding on the locus and focus of power in a 
highly volatile African environment. The kind of power that is required is one 
that takes decisive action against non-progressive, unwarranted and 
unjustifiable ‘segregation and discrimination’ (Glazer 1981:13). 
 
A MERIT BASED REWARD SYSTEM AS A BASIS FOR JUSTICE IN AFRICA  
The whole question of the mechanisms for pursuing the realization of justice in 
Africa is dependent on the amalgamation of a combination of values and 
institutions. The most notable that we have chosen to discuss are the role of the 
constitution, leadership, interest groups, formal and informal agents of legal 
and legitimate socialization and association. We are especially inclined to 
discerning their core tasks and focus as pursuing all known formal and 
informal means of establishing and sustaining machineries for power 
  
acquisition and transfer, effective and productive social dialogue, definition 
and guarantee of viable citizenship and the installation of machineries of 
desert and merit based individual and distributive justice.  These tasks call for 
the creation of new approaches to the management of the African realities, as 
well as the construction of new levels of aspirations for all stakeholders. This is 
simply the demand for attitude change, which depends on reviewing the 
scope and attractiveness of the reward system and the credibility that goes 
with the new vision of justice and development in Africa.  
There is a need for merit in the affairs of a people and society. This is the 
more significant in the context of Africa that is bedeviled by all sorts of 
persons and institutions making undeserved and unmerited claims on others, 
due to factors such as ethnicity, corruption, ineptitude, influence, ignorance, 
etc. according to Pojman (1997:557&558) ‘we also speak of merit as 
focusing on the actual outcome of or contribution of actions. Rewarding good 
works encourages further good works and punishment deters bad actions. By 
recognizing and rewarding merit, we promote efficiency and welfare.’ 
Daniels (1978:207) makes a similar point when he insists that merit is basically 
‘ability plus effort. Claims of merit are derived from considerations of 
efficiency or productivity.’ 
For justice to prevail in Africa there is a need for reviewing our reward 
system such that incentives for meritorious acts of excellence, diligence and 
good conduct will be nationalized and institutionalized. These tasks can start 
with the demarcation of the scope of rewards for merit within core institutions. 
These rewards can take the form of providing commendations, incentives, 
opportunities and awards in cash or kind. This will ensure the mitigation of 
ethnicity and nepotism. As Young (1994:88) puts it so directly, ‘nepotism 
should go, bribery should go, inheritance should go as means of attaining 
public office, the belief has become established that it is wrong to allow 
nepotism, bribery, or inheritance any sway: individual merit should be the only 
test that should apply.’ 
Therefore, we must move the quest for a solution forward by realizing and 
admitting that ‘responsibility is ascribed to collectives (nations, groups, etc) as 
well as to individual persons’ (Cooper 1968:258).  Our lives will make more 
sense only in the context of what Struhl (1976:158) refers to as ‘a community 
of human beings who value each other and who recognize each other as ends 
in themselves.  This mutual respect will create a community of mature, creative 
and self regulating human beings’ in order to allow for growth. Jeter (2003) 
has insisted that ‘if we are deceived into concentrating on our differences and 
not common interests then enmity and rivalry will trespass where hope and 
cooperation should prevail’.  Finally, the point is that there is difference, but 
the question is the extent to which difference can be allowed as a basis for 
misery, insensitivity, exploitation and domination. The members of society 
cannot achieve the peace, security and progress of each and all unless they 
establish a clear and effective system of social justice. 
The quest for an alternative view of justice that can ensure the liberation and 
transformation of Africa must apparently depend on a combination of 
principles and values that will form the composite for rectification. We must 
  
confront the critical problem of devising a sustainable strategy for normative 
change and social or cosmological reconstruction that is embedded in the 
recreating of a philosophy of justice for development. What are the means 
for the improvement of the African situation vis-a-vis the quest for an idea of 
justice for development? Firstly, there is the compelling need to disengage 
from the hitherto existing philosophy of justice in Africa that currently, ‘is often 
a function of who you know or how much you can pay’ (Harrison 2000:300). 
This requires a repudiation of forms of debased and unwholesome conduct in 
the justice arena.  
In most parts of Africa, we can easily calibrate the scope of the failures of the 
various instruments of justice, such as the police, law courts, prisons, etc; the 
operations of these institutions have been defeated largely by inefficiency, 
under-funding, incompetence, ethnicity, politicisation and social dissatisfaction. 
As Fox (2000) observes ‘any account of what the courts are intended to 
achieve immediately shows up their inadequacies and deficiencies.’  Thus we 
must seek a more systematic and holistic way of creating and institutionalising 
the principles and values that can ensure enduring and viable philosophy of 
justice that can positively affect the redirection of African development 
towards security, morality, peace and well-being. This is a normative and 
empirical engagement with the African historical and cultural values. To 
succeed, our effort depends on a dualistic moral and institutional re-entry into 
reconfiguring the African problem of social change for liberation and 
transformation. In concrete terms, we argue for an idea of individual futuristic 
justice embodied in the concept of trust that depends on the distributive 
paradigm understood as that, which takes from each according to his/her 
ability and gives to each according to his/her need or contribution.  
Let us now descend from the meta-ethical realm to the engagement with 
existential and phenomenological realities. The first stage of the theorizing for 
rectification is to seek certain existent principles or derivable templates for 
erecting a new or alternate view of justice. This task requires nothing other 
than the erection or recalibration of core values for a new philosophy of 
justice for development. A progressive or viable society is likely to define 
justice or ‘distributive justice as that which also interests of future 
generations’ (Grondona 2000:48). Luckily, the Africans had, and still do have 
a concept of this consideration for the future and even for the past or dead 
people. This advantage can be turned to the side of the Africans in their 
search for an alternate form of justice.  Mbiti (1969:105-107) puts it to us 
that the African kinship system ‘extends vertically to include the departed and 
those yet to be born. African concept of the family also includes the unborn 
members who are still in the loins of the living.’ The next thing therefore is to 
employ the substrate provided by this philosophy of consideration for 
generating a stable and just system for African societies that judges or 
reckons with posterity.  
Given the problematic as we understand it, the endemic susceptibility of 
African social and political life to injustices and perversions is due to the 
absence of a proper idea of justice that can underwrite the internal 
consistency and wider social political consequences of the developmental 
processes in Africa. But then to talk about injustice requires the use of moral 
concepts and the making of moral judgements’ (Crocker 1991:460), thus 
implying that we are in need of core normative, ethical and phenomenological 
presuppositions that can foster certain developmentally suitable values and 
  
attitudes. In our search for a viable philosophy of justice in Africa ‘principles 
of justice are needed, because not all demands and claims can be satisfied; 
principles of justice are the answer to inevitable disappointments and 
inequalities’(Ehman 1980:14) 
However, the attainment of this end necessitates the postulation of a new 
philosophy of justice for viable social order and holistic development in Africa.  
We may reiterate the point that every state is known by the nature and 
quality of justice that it maintains.  The sort of justice that modern Africa 
requires for its development is a system of social justice, which aims at a 
pattern of fair treatment for people.  The primary subject of this justice is the 
way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights, duties 
and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.  Justice has 
to be defined according to certain principles of equitable, fair and humane 
distribution of benefits and burdens.  Justice makes sense as the attempt to 
reconcile opposing views and desires, and the intention to work out a free, 
fair, beneficial and equitable means of producing and sharing social goods.  
Nielsen (1996:82) puts it that ‘the question of justice is the question of what is 
that genuine social order that can guarantee human flourishing (and) social 
harmony in which people acknowledge their communal nature and their self-
autonomy’ (Nielsen, 1996:81-82).  
Conceived in this way, justice is a concept operational in the domain of the 
joint claims and actions of persons.  Justice refers to that respect which persons 
show for ‘the freedom of others, and the chance that they give others to be 
themselves, and to develop their potentials’ (Peperzak 1971:154-155).  It 
affirms the sociality of persons and the immense importance of providing ‘a 
reasonable basis of agreement among people who seek to take due account 
of the interests of all’ (Nielsen, 1996:86-87). The need for social 
transformation and rectification compels an interrogation of the core 
principles of social order as they affect those groups that are susceptible to 
injustice. This raises issues about the reconstruction of just social order. To the 
extent that there is a need for the conscious and systematic institutionalisation 
of the mutual bond in the society, the actualisation of the common good 
becomes a moral concern. And as such becomes a basis for the attainment of 
justice and other core values. In this case, it requires that individuals must 
recognize the personhood of others and their rights to have a secure and 
worthwhile existence.  The application of the rules of justice ensures that 
human-beings can live with dignity, freedom and responsibility.  Freedom as 
one major essence of human life is to be upheld because without it people 
cannot develop. This point is most significant in relation to those in governance 
and the governed.   
According to Kymlicka (1999:6) a theory of justice in a multicultural state will 
combine universal rights with group-differentiated rights.  Kymlicka 
(1999:173) holds that we need to focus on the wider context of solidarity.  In 
our quest for ties that bind there is the question of social justice, community 
and fraternity.  For Kymlicka (1999:187) the possible basis of social unity in a 
multination state cannot be far from the retention of feelings of social or 
national consciousness, commitment and a strong sense of patriotism.  In a 
way, social unity depends on shared values. Such values may include: belief in 
equality and fairness; belief in consultation and dialogue; the importance of 
accommodation and tolerance; support for diversity, compassion and 
generosity; commitment to freedom, peace and non-violent change. Given the 
above situation, Pojman (1997:549-558), is right when he insists that ‘justice is 
  
a constant and perpetual will to give every man his due’.  A society that has a 
commitment to rewarding those who contribute to its well being and punishing 
those who purposefully undermine it will survive and prosper better than a 
society that lacks these beliefs or practices. Evidently, the proper question of 
justice is the calibration of a system of institutions, practices, values and 
beliefs. It is the whole gamut of the reorientation and transformation of ways 
of life.  
Still on the normative and phenomenological conditions for the erection of 
justice in Africa, we also learn from Hospers (1976:616) that a just society 
needs to ‘define and recognize individual rights and to embed these rights in 
the constitutional structure, so that no would be tyrant can take them away’.  
More importantly, it should be noted that the specific function of justice is to 
establish between these claims, the due limits and harmonious proportions 
(Johann 1966:41). It is right for Haring (1979:470) to say that justice needs to 
be upheld in order to ensure that there is peace, order and stability in the 
society.  The consistency and commitment with which a society seeks peace will 
determine the extent to which it will guarantee the survival and well-being of 
the people. 
To this extent, the idea of social justice encapsulates every aspect of 
institutional rules and relations, which are subject to potential collective 
decision.  In the light of the prevalence of social conflicts, questions about 
social justice will continue to be relevant, in so far as there is domination and 
oppression in society.  It is obvious therefore, that social justice emphasizes the 
well-being and welfare of every individual in society.  Social justice is, as 
such, a fundamental framework for the total development of the human 
person in his or her physical, social and spiritual life. Social justice among 
other things demands the establishment of institutions and rules of fair 
competition for social benefits and the equality of opportunity for every 
individual or group to develop his or her capabilities and talents to the 
optimum.  
Social justice seeks to create those economic, political, moral and intellectual 
conditions which will allow the citizens to live a fully human 
life’ (Pazhayampallil, 1995: 878-879).  Thus, the institution of social justice is 
indispensable for the establishment and sustenance of social order, because it 
provides the basic principles and structures by which we can achieve just 
distribution of benefits and burdens in the society.  The establishment of a 
system of social justice is of immense importance, especially to the multi-ethnic 
nation-states of Africa.  The requirements of social justice in these ethno-
cultural plural nation-states demand the urgent establishment of an open 
society (Gyekye, 1997:89).  Such a society must be a democratic system that 
gives fair and equal consideration to the interests of all citizens, irrespective 
of their creed, sex and background.  In such societies, merit and achievement 
must be given pre-eminence as the critical conditions for the distribution of 
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